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Introduction: Why Ploesti? 
On June 5
th
, 1942, the United States declared war on Romania. American troops 
were nowhere near the southeastern European nation, nor would they ever have any 
significant presence there. The decision was due solely to two factors: the doctrine and 
equipment that had been developed by the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) 
during the period between the two world wars, and the view that Allied planners had of 
the importance of Romanian crude oil production to the German war economy. Romania 
became a target for American military planners a mere seven months after Pearl Harbor 
because of the technology of the four-engine heavy bomber, the uniquely American 
concept of strategic bombing, and certain assumptions of the German economic system. 
 The amount of literature on the strategic bombing of occupied Europe is 
voluminous. For the sake of simplicity, the existing historiography can be divided into 
three general views. The first focuses on the heroism of the combat crews in the face of 
impossible odds, an excellent illustration would be Steven Ambrose‟s The Wild Blue. 
The second view is one that recognizes the intentions and heroic sacrifices of those 
carrying out the bombing while also acknowledging that mistakes were made in the 
course of the campaign. Prime examples would be Bombs, Cities, and Civilians by 
Conrad C. Crane and Robert Pape‟s Bombing To Win. The third general conception is 
one that focuses on the civilian tragedy and questions the real motives of air commanders 
in no uncertain terms. Wings of Judgment by Ronald Shaffer exemplifies this line of 
argument. This study does not look to solve or contribute to the moral and philosophical 
questions that have bogged down the historiography of USAAF strategic bombing, but 
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rather focuses on the soundness of the fundamental beliefs on which strategic bombing 
missions in World War Two were based. The doctrine that inspired the USAAF‟s 
campaign above Romania and the rest of occupied Europe was based on theory and 
mathematical calculations that were in almost every respect removed from both practical 
and strategic reality. The strategic bombing campaign during the war is best understood 
as an attempt to align the hypothetical and much trumpeted destructive capabilities of air 
power with the realities inherent in an active struggle against a dynamic, adaptable 
enemy. 
 The various attacks upon the thirteen major oil refineries situated around the city 
of Ploesti, Romania combine to form the perfect case study for analyzing the practical 
application of U.S. strategic bombing doctrine by removing the variables of place and 
target type from the equation. Ploesti is useful as a case study because it contained 
industrial targets clearly distinguished from nearby population centers, all manner of anti-
aircraft defenses available were represented, and every conceivable means available to 
achieve destruction of the target was employed by the Army Air Force. It is, in many 
ways, a microcosm of the strategic bombing campaign over Europe. The historical 
literature approaches the USAAF‟s missions over Ploesti in one of two ways. Either they 
are viewed as a series of individual attacks that are interesting in and of themselves, 
mainly due to the unique nature and costly attack of August 1
st
 1943, or they are 
discussed only in their relation to the overall oil campaign. Therefore there exists a gap in 
the literature for one to analyze the Ploesti raids collectively as a means by which to 
determine the effectiveness of „precision‟ bombing.  
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 The purpose of this study is not to provide a narrative of the air raids on oil 
refineries in the Ploesti area as there are previous works available that accomplish this 
extraordinarily well. In any work of history a firm understanding of the story is required, 
and it will be discussed as necessary. But the true focus of this paper is instead on the 
development of an intellectual concept, its refinement, and its practical application as 
allowed or restrained by the technology available at the time.
1
 The central themes of 
                                                 
1
 In a desire to provide a more integrated approach the author consulted not only scholarly and public 
works on the many bombings of the Ploesti area but also much time and energy was invested in 
understanding and presenting the thought process behind and implications of doctrinal development during 
the interwar period. Only by a marriage of the two is it possible to truly understand what occurred at 
Ploesti. For insight into doctrinal development both Thomas H. Greer‟s The Development of Air Doctrine 
in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 and Robert T. Finney‟s History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-
1940 are invaluable. These were supplemented by Stephen L. McFarland‟s America's Pursuit of Precision 
Bombing, which provides wonderful insight into the technological developments necessary to even attempt 
the concepts developed at the Air Corps Tactical School. “American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl 
Harbor” by Mark Clodfetter painted a much broader picture, allowing one to easily see how early doctrinal 
thought plugged into later theory. A central pillar of this theory is discussed by the person responsible for 
it, Donald Wilson, in his article “Origin of a Theory for Air Strategy.” The doctrine developed at ACTS is 
codified in AWPD/1 and AWPD/42. James C. Gaston‟s Planning the American Air War: Four Men and 
Nine Days in 1941 provides a wonderfully vivid portrait of the men and circumstances involved in the 
development of AWPD/1, and The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler by Haywood S. Hansell gives us a 
firsthand account of the entire doctrinal process from embryonic beginnings to the war‟s conclusion. In 
order to understand the value of USAAF strategic bombing doctrine and to properly analyze its effects a 
firm grasp of the system upon which it was to be unleashed is vital. For this purpose, Burton H. Klein‟s 
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, Alan S. Milward‟s The German Economy at War, John 
Gillingham‟s Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr coal, Hitler, and Europe, and Adam Tooze‟s 
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi War Economy provided the framework. 
This was supplemented with “The German War Economy” by Nicholas Kaldor and R.J. Overy‟s “Hitler‟s 
War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation.”  In “The Importance of Energy in the First and 
Second World Wars,” W.G. Jensen takes a focused look at the role of this resource, while Alfred C. 
Mierzejewski convincingly bucks the established narrative in The Collapse of the German War Economy, 
1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway. R.L. Dinardo‟s “Horse-Drawn Transport 
in the German Army” and  Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?: Horses and the German 
Army of World War II complement Mierzejewski‟s view that oil was not the vital target system the Allies 
thought. In a desire for a more thorough understanding of the German air defense situation the author 
turned to The Luftwaffe Fighter Force: The View From the Cockpit by Adolf Galland and the phenomenal 
work that is Edward B. Westerman‟s Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945. For a more focused 
look at the Ploesti campaign James Dugan and Carol Stewart‟s Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 
August 1943 and Leon Wolff‟s Low Level Mission provide a wonderful insight into that famous raid, while 
Leroy W. Newby‟s Target Ploesti: View from a Bombsight and Jay A. Stout‟s Fortress Ploesti: The 
Campaign to Destroy Hitler’s Oil focus on the 1944 campaign by the 15th Air Force. For an analysis of the 
bombing, both then and now, the author looked to six different United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS) reports, Albert Speer‟s memoirs Inside the Third Reich, John F. Kreis‟ Piercing the Fog: 
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conceptualization, development, societal acceptance, application, and evaluation hold 
true in the development of all technologies; this study simply addresses these issues in a 
military setting. 
 The United States‟ strategic bombing campaign in World War Two covered a 
large amount of time, proceeded at various levels of intensity, and regularly shifted target 
priorities. The many raids against Ploesti are ideal for the study of doctrinal application 
due to the many attacks against the area, the many different types of attacks used, and the 
single and continuous nature of the targeted system. The Ploesti raids, looked at 
collectively, can in fact be construed as a doctrinal laboratory; when studied detached 
from the broader picture it can be difficult to recognize an established bombardment 
doctrine in practice. 
 Another benefit from studying the Ploesti campaign is the illumination of the 
relationship between a rigid bureaucracy, the idea that brought about its establishment, 
and the capability of both to adapt to a rapidly changing situation. The United States 
Army Air Corps succeeded in selling its concept of strategic bombardment to both 
military planners and civilian policymakers, and in order to implement this theory a vast 
program of procurement and training was put into motion. This human and mechanical 
juggernaut took on the form of a Roosevelt-era bureaucracy, and as a result several 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intelligence and Army Air Force Operations in World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower‟s Crusade in Europe, 
Henry Harley Arnold‟s Global Mission, and The War Reports of Gens. Marshall, Arnold, and King. An 
extensive amount of archival material from the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama was used to understand the operations at Ploesti and the immediate 
military analysis. Daylight Raids by the U.S. Eighth Air Force: Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from 
World War II by Frank Heilenday provided an insight into the positives and negatives of bombing, and of 
course the venerable series The Army Air Forces in World War II by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea 
Cate provided a firm foundation to return to when the author found himself lost, distracted, or too far out on 
a limb. 
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changes demanded by combat experience were not incorporated into the strategic 
bombing system. After studying the disparity between what was expected to happen in 
regards to strategic bombing before the war and what was possible at Ploesti one cannot 
help but be more sympathetic to the plight of Yossarian in Joseph Heller‟s classic novel. 
In fact, Catch-22 is an excellent illustration of the frustration that must have been felt by 
bomb crews as they continually risked their lives attempting to force mathematical 
calculations and theory into reality. This very real disconnect between what was actually 
possible and what the established bureaucracy preached was possible is vividly apparent 
when one looks at the Ploesti raids in their totality. 
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Chapter 1: The Development of American Air 
Power Doctrine 
 
 Since the Wright Brothers‟ first flight on December 17, 1903, the military 
implications of aviation were ever in the minds of decision makers. There was no doubt 
the airplane would have a role in modern military campaigns, the question was what that 
role would be. This debate would be the cause of great tension and even open conflict 
within both the military and civilian sectors. It was during the roughly two decades of the 
interwar years that, by equal parts persuasion and subterfuge, American airmen refined a 
unique concept of air power that was sold to the American public and politicians on the 
eve of World War Two. 
 United States strategic bombing doctrine as developed between the world wars 
consisted of four central tenets: 1) bombing was to be from high altitude, 2) it was to 
destroy „precision‟ targets which would result in the collapse of the enemy‟s economic 
structure, 3) it was to occur during daylight, 4) the bombers were to be self-defending. 
Once exposed to prolonged combat it became obvious to many that number four was not 
feasible without sustaining prohibitive losses, and both contemporaries and historians 
have debated whether the second point was achieved or even possible. Therefore, only 
50% of the USAAF‟s strategic bombing doctrine is 100% defensible.  How was such a 
concept developed? How were so many Americans, both those in the command structure 
and those doing the actual flying and dying, convinced of its practicality? 
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The Beginning 
 In order to fully understand the development of American strategic bombing 
doctrine it is necessary to begin at the first large-scale military application of airpower, 
World War One. During this conflict airpower was primarily used as an auxiliary to the 
land forces; it filled the roles of reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and was used to 
achieve and maintain air dominance over the field of battle. Though these were the 
accepted roles of this new technology at the time, there were those who saw possibilities 
beyond the immediate area of action. “Before the end of the war preparations were well 
advanced for a fairly extensive air offensive by the Allies. Furthermore, the Americans 
had developed a definite and thorough doctrine to support strategic bombardment.”2 This 
was most succinctly stated in a document written by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell in his 
position as leader of the Strategic Aviation Branch. Disregarding all activities in direct 
support of the trenches as viable targets for bombardment, Gorrell looked to the 
destruction of the enemy nation‟s productive capacity, which was supporting their 
military, as the proper target and one that could effectively break the stalemate. General 
Pershing fully approved the plan on January 5, 1918.
3
 The trench warfare of World War 
One is important to keep in mind as the obsessive desire to ensure that such a situation 
would not happen again provided the drive for almost all interwar doctrinal and 
technological development.  
                                                 
2
 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941. (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL.: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955; Office of Air Force 
History, U.S. Air Force, 1985), 10. 
3
 Mark Clodfetter. “American Air Campaign Planning before Pearl Harbor,” The Journal of Military 
History, 58, no.1 (Jan., 1994): 76. 
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 Historian Thomas Greer clearly linked the work of Gorrell to what would follow 
at the Air Corps‟ most advanced school. “The Gorrell plan was a truly striking forerunner 
of the doctrine which matured years later in the Air Corps Tactical School.”4 This plan 
also marks the beginning of the detachment of bombing doctrine from strategic and 
practical reality. While the idea of destroying the economic foundation of the enemy, 
resulting in their complete inability to wage modern war, sounds very efficient, was it 
even possible to penetrate into the industrial heart of Germany with Handley Page 0/400s 
and Vickers Vimys?
5
 Even if these aircraft managed to survive both enemy pursuit 
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery fire and reached their targets there was the matter of 
actually landing the bombs on a critical point in the system to bring about sufficient 
destruction so as to have an effect on the enemy‟s frontline combat troops. Gorrell‟s 
successors attempted to address these issues. The end of World War One prevented a 
combat test of Gorrell‟s theory, but the concept of bombing the production centers of 
belligerent industrialized nations did not go away.  
 American air power advocate Brigadier General William Mitchell, “generally 
regarded as the American counterpart of the RAF‟s Trenchard and the Italian Douhet,”6 
took three very important lessons from his experience in World War One. The first was 
that the nature of air power was one of flexibility and mobility; to tie it to slow and 
immobile ground armies was to surrender its greatest strength. Also, and this would be a 
                                                 
4
 Greer, 11. 
5
 The HP 0/400 had a max range of 450 miles, a 8,500 feet ceiling, 76 mph max speed and a maximum 
bomb load of 2,000 lbs, while the Vimy managed to improve on the Handley Page in many respects with a 
910 mile max range, 7,000 foot ceiling, 103 mph top speed and 4,800 lb bomb load. (Robert Jackson. The 
Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft. (Bath, UK: Parragon, 2006), 183, 363.) 
6
 Greer, 17. 
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key point for later theorists, air power should not be diffused amongst the various 
commanders but rather amassed in a single striking force to allow for its concentrated 
application. Third, since air power was to be concentrated, only officers within the air 
service could possibly understand its potential and apply such a force properly. These 
beliefs all went against the established air organization during World War One, where 
individual commanders had control of the air resources within their theater of 
operations.
7
 This would become a fundamental point in the interwar struggle. “The 
question of the organization of the air arm became inextricably interwoven with the 
question of deployment.”8    
 The effects of the interwar period upon the psyche of airmen cannot be overstated, 
and much would be learned in respect to public relations. “From 1919 to 1939 the history 
of the Army air arm was dominated by a struggle for recognition which left a deep 
imprint upon the air organization and its personnel.”9 At first the struggle was for air 
independence, and when that could not be achieved the goal shifted to partial autonomy 
within the Army. Numerous bills, boards, and committees came into existence during this 
time, all seeking to address the question of where aviation would fit within the existing 
military structure, and always there was Mitchell and his disciples calling for separation 
                                                 
7
 There were two exceptions to this, as at St.-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Mitchell was able to wrest control 
of available aircraft and apply this combined force on the battlefield to great effect. (Robert T. Finney, 
History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: USAF Historical 
Division, Research Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1955; Air Force History 
and Museums Program, 1998), 3.) 
8
 Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.: 
USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1955; Air 
Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 5. 
9
 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol I. 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 17. 
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from the backward thinking and dogmatically-entrenched Army. The question of military 
organization became such a hotbed issue that “between 1926 and 1935 twelve bills for a 
Department of Aeronautics and seventeen for a single Department of Defense were 
presented in Congress.”10 This does not include the plethora of „definitive‟ boards 
established to analyze the matter, such as the Menoher Board in 1919, the Morrow Board 
in 1925, or the Baker Board in 1934. The repeated exercise of testifying before a 
committee and having the proceedings reported in the following day‟s paper allowed the 
aviation „rebels‟ to learn exactly what policymakers and the public would accept and 
reject in regards to the organization and proper use of air power. For instance, it was 
through this public discussion that it became obvious that Americans had no desire to 
partake in the indiscriminate bombing of population centers and airmen adjusted their 
doctrine (at least the public utterances of it) to accommodate public demand. “This 
ethical concern of the American people was largely responsible, also, for the 
development of the idea of precision bombing as opposed to mass attacks. An openly 
advocated program of mass bombardment would have found virtually no support in the 
United States.”11 
 It was during this period of institutional uncertainty that the Air Service Tactical 
School was established in 1920 at Langley Field in Virginia. The school was renamed the 
Air Corp Tactical School (ACTS)
12
 and moved to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama in 
1931. It was there that Gorrell‟s theory would be refined and crystallized over the next 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 29. 
11
 Greer, 15. (Underlined by the author for emphasis.) 
12
 The name change was a result of the Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926, which provided for minimal 
reorganization. 
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decade. The influence of ACTS would be acutely felt in the next world war, as the school 
“would graduate 261 of the 320 generals serving in the Army Air Forces at the end of 
World War II.”13 The school served as a collection point for those interested not only in 
the proven capabilities of air power but also its possibilities. “In 1929 the Tactical School 
adopted as its motto: Proficimus More Irretenti. (We Make Progress Unhindered by 
Custom).”14 Though still officially chained to the Army‟s doctrine for the use of air 
power, the atmosphere at ACTS was always one of pushing boundaries and its existence 
would be characterized by radical intellectual theory coupled with conflicting official 
pronouncements. 
 An illustration of this duality can be seen in the bombing tests upon naval vessels 
engineered by Mitchell in the early 1920s. In July 1921 the captured German battleships 
Frankfurt and Ostfriesland were successfully sunk, followed by the aging American 
cruisers the Virginia and New Jersey in September 1923. Though much was made of 
these displays at the expense of the Navy, “there was, however, nothing especially 
profound about aircraft dropping hundreds of bombs to sink immobile ships unprotected 
by antiaircraft artillery.”15 At their core these tests were an attempt to wrestle funds for 
the expansion of military aviation, but they also provided a publicly accepted argument 
for such investment in a purely offensive weapon. It was decided that military aviation 
would be sold by the advocates of air power to the public and congressional leaders as a 
defensive weapon, one which could defend the coasts as well as, if not better than, the 
                                                 
13
 Clodfetter, 83. 
14
 Finney. vii. 
15
 Stephen L. McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing.  (Washington: Smithsonian Institute 
Press, 1995), 47. 
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existing Navy. Due to economic considerations and the strong aversion to aggressive 
conflict during this period, the only hope of receiving any funding at all was in the name 
of defense. The fact that first two and then four engine bombers were even able to be 
discussed within a defensive context speaks volumes to the insight and wizardry of 
airmen at the time. 
 The focus in the 1920s on the proper organization of air power and use of force 
can be seen in the Air Service Tactical School‟s 1926 text Bombardment. While not 
going too far beyond the party line in regards to the use of military aviation in the field, it 
did push to codify the principle of massed force. It argued that bombardment aviation “is 
seldom, if ever, allotted to a group of armies. Such an allotment would be in violation of 
one of the fundamental principles of bombardment employment.”16 The text also 
recognized the reality that one mission would not suffice to knock out a target. “It is 
apparent that complete destruction by bombardment is to be accomplished only by 
concentrated and continuous operations.”17 If you cannot bomb continuously, should you 
then bomb at all? If you cannot ensure the destruction of the target then you have 
sacrificed men and planes needlessly and alerted the enemy to your intentions. This 
practical concept of continuous operations would be lost during the 1930s and the 
slightest resemblance of it would not come into use over Ploesti until 1944. 
 Unfortunately for the historian, Bombardment cannot be taken at face value. One 
must remember that the true philosophy of air men differed widely from what was 
accepted within the Army. After the 1925 court-martial of Gen. Mitchell, and his 
                                                 
16
 United States. Air Corps Tactical School. Bombardment. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1926), 1. 
17
 Ibid., 3. (Underlined by author for emphasis.) 
  Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.16 
 
subsequent early retirement in 1926, this philosophy did not wither and die but instead 
was removed to private conversations while the public dialogue conformed to accepted 
thought. This makes it very difficult for the historian who must therefore read between 
the lines and always take official Air Corps statements with a large grain of salt. Wesley 
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, in Volume I of their seminal work, The Army Air 
Forces in World War II, summed up the situation beautifully: 
  
So it was that the training guides, as textbooks for young officers, were 
not only dull in the inimitable style of Army manuals; on controversial 
issues they were at best noncommittal and at worst misleading. And 
hence, paradoxically, we must seek the air arm‟s underlying philosophy of 
warfare not in the official pronouncements but first in the public 
utterances of its radicals and later in the less widely disseminated thought 
of its most advanced school. This approach is not wholly satisfactory, but 
it is the only way to explain, other than by supporting a sudden reversal of 
opinion, the emergence shortly before World War II of a well-developed 
theory of warfare in which strategic bombardment played the predominant 
role. In its most essential features this theory was evolved by Mitchell in 
the mid-twenties; by 1939 it had become an article of faith privately held 





Of the four central tenets of bombardment discussed earlier, every one of them can be 
traced to the Tactical School, and the genesis and acceptance of each raises questions. 
 
The Influence of the Air Corp Tactical School 
 It is impossible to point to one instructor at ACTS who was responsible for the 
entirety of the bombardment doctrine that developed over the 1930s. The process was in 
many ways a synthesis of ideas, a type of group think that evolved slowly into something 
                                                 
18
 Craven and Cate, vol. 1, 35. (Underlined by author for emphasis.) 
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that one would recognize as a cohesive theory.
19
 One of the reasons for this was the 
circular flow of knowledge within the school; students became instructors and passed 
down theory as fact. “By the mid-thirties…of the 17 Air Corps officers on duty at the 
school, 16 were graduates of ACTS…”20  Couple this with the freedom inherent in the 
distance between Alabama and Washington D.C. and it becomes understandable why 
something so different from established thought would be born and nurtured at the Air 
Corps Tactical School. Though it is not easy to pierce through this developmental fog, 
there are certain instructors who contributed vital pieces to the overall whole.  
 According to Dr. Stephen McFarland, Lieutenant Kenneth Walker is most 
responsible for the decision to bomb at high altitudes. During tests at the Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds between July and November of 1931, the curious phenomenon of 
bomb-skipping was discovered and studied intently. “If they landed on hard surfaces, the 
bombs tended to roll, skid, or tumble an average of 141 feet in range and 25 feet in 
deflection. The small angle of impact made fuses more liable to fail. Bombs tended to 
detonate on their sides, reducing the effects of both the explosion and resulting 
fragmentation.”21 One must wonder if the planners of the 1943 low-level raid on Ploesti 
were aware of this study or if anyone protested based on this study‟s findings. Gravity 
allowed bombs to bury before explosion and in order for this to occur time was needed; 
time that was only made available if bombing altitude was increased. “The inability to 
                                                 
19
 The development of doctrine at ACTS would make for a very interesting study of group psychology.  
20
 Finney, 23. 
21
 McFarland, 86. 
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produce the mining effect for a low-altitude release, however, reduced the explosive 
power of bombs by four and a half times.”22 
 Could a bomb dropped from high altitude actually hit a precision target? The 
Norden M-I bombsight, though a remarkable development for its time, was not perfect.
23
 
The first of these new bombsights reached the Army in April 1933 and required a steady 
approach and clear weather over the target to be effective.
24
 Once again, Walker came to 
the rescue and provided theoretical support for high-altitude bombardment. Using 
probability in much the same way as the artillery corps, he formulated the amount of 
aircraft needed, and hence bombs released, to hit the desired target. “But his next step 
was unfortunately too simplistic. If the “single-shot probability” of obtaining a hit within 
the area of a proposed target was, for instance, one in ten, he reasoned that one should 
drop ten bombs to be sure of one hit. Of course, this wasn‟t so.”25 Getting bombs „on 
target‟ would be a continuous issue during the war and the bombsight tests compiled in 
the following table portray the difficulty in hitting a 100 x 100 foot „precision‟ target.26 It 
is important to remember that enemy defenses would force attack altitude and speed to be 
much higher than those used during bombsight testing. There was still much room for 
improving accuracy before America entered the war: 
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 In the six months before Pearl Harbor, bombardiers dropped nearly 50,000 
bombs on practice targets. At an average speed of 170 mph and with no 
drops from above 20,000 feet, not one group, on average, could achieve 
the standards set in Training Manual 1-250 for first-, second-, or third 







          
28
 
 Along with the matter of delivery came the question of what constituted a viable 
target. As stated earlier, the bombing of non-combatants was looked upon with distain by 
the American public. Throughout the 1930s there were examples of such attacks, the 
Italian bombing of Ethiopia and the Condor Legion‟s bombing of Guernica were but two 
of many, which only served to reinforce this notion in the United States. The concept of 
directly attacking military targets along the front, through close air support and 
interdiction missions, would more easily be facilitated by the commanders in the field 
and airmen desperately wanted control of their own destinies. These two reasons helped 
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the doctrine developed at ACTS to mirror Gorrell‟s from the previous war.  
 While Gorrell‟s reports were a matter of record, the primary intellectual 
supporting argument, the industrial web theory, according to Donald Wilson, originated 
in his courses at ACTS during the 1933-1934 term.
29
 In an article written in 1971 to 
clarify doctrinal development, Wilson provides a stunning insight into the minds of air 
planners.  By looking at the United States as a blueprint for every industrialized nation, 
the belief developed that only certain key points in the economic infrastructure would 
have to be destroyed for the entire structure to collapse. These lynchpins, according to 
Wilson, consisted of transportation, electric power, and steel production.
30
 These were 
considered „precision‟ targets due to the fact that they were specific, well-defined, and 
vital to the continuation of the enemy‟s war effort. In many respects the selection of 
targets can be viewed as an inverse pyramid, with the belligerent nation as a whole being 
the largest section on top. It was the goal of doctrinal developers at ACTS and later those 
charged with target selection to determine the pieces of the economy that supported the 
sections above them. Target priorities would change during the course of the war, 
resulting in target systems not being subjected to the continuous attacks required to 
ensure their destruction as discussed earlier in Bombardment. “As for the possibility of 
repairing this devastation, it seemed obvious that any air force should be able to destroy 
faster than repair or replacement could be effected.”31 The Germans, in many ways, 
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invalidated this belief in assured destruction as they would many other assumptions 
during actual operations. 
 Due to the nature of the targets selected it was recognized that night bombing 
could not be the method adopted by the United States Army Air Force. It would be 
difficult to pick out population centers in pitch black, let alone „precision‟ targets. “By 
1932, the school had endorsed explicitly the concept of daylight bombardment.”32 One of 
the primary advantages of night bombing was the perceived difficulty it gave the 
defenders and hence the better survivability of the air crews. Wouldn‟t the planes flying 
in broad daylight be sitting ducks for enemy anti-aircraft defenses, especially if the target 
systems were known in advance? To counter this drawback in precision doctrine another 
intellectual theory was developed, that of the „self-defending‟ or „invincible‟ bomber.  
 The belief that an air offensive was indefensible was not a new one. H.G. Wells‟ 
fictional representation of the next international conflict, War in the Air, was published a 
mere five years after the Wright‟s flight and illustrates the terrifying position that this 
new invention held in the public mind. A plethora of books on the subject followed 
within the next twenty years, including one by Mitchell entitled Winged Defense. It was 
not that there was no defense whatsoever against bombardment, pursuit aviation and anti-
aircraft artillery would continue to be improved throughout this period with the express 
intention of negating the bombers, but it was the strengths of aviation, speed and freedom 
of movement, that created the aura of invincibility. The crossing of the English Channel 
by Louis Bleriot in 1909 had a profound effect on the British and forced them to 
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reevaluate their concept of security in this new air age. The ideas first espoused by Wells 
quickly moved from science fiction to science fact in the eyes of the public and made 
their way upwards through the halls of policymakers and government officials. The fear 
of the bomber has been forever enshrined in the famous statement by then Member of 
Parliament Stanley Baldwin. “I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that 
there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed, whatever people may 
tell him. The bomber will always get through…”33 
 With this belief already prevalent it is understandable that the United States Army 
Air Force would accept the corresponding notion, that their bombers would be able to 
successfully bomb their targets regardless of enemy opposition. The major difference 
between what was being discussed by everyone from reporters to politicians and those at 
ACTS was the nature of the targets. If you are interested in indiscriminately bombing 
your enemy you have a plethora of targets from which to chose from, in fact anywhere 
within their borders, and such a vast number of possibilities would indeed be 
indefensible. On the other hand, if you have a doctrine that lists certain industries as the 
only acceptable targets due to a desired outcome then you provide the enemy the ability 
to centralize their fighter and anti-aircraft artillery at defined targets, making the job of 
the defender infinitely easier. If you then insist on making repeated attacks against such 
heavily defended targets the situation has the potential to become both tragic and darkly 
comical. Such a self-imposed target limitation, when combined with the newly developed 
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technology of radar, would allow for a high level of defensive preparation before USAAF 
attacks. 
 Craven and Cate looked to the effect of the coastal defense exercises of spring 
1933 upon Brigadier General Westover, Assistant Chief of Air Corps, as a reason for the 
incorporation of the invincible bomber theory into official USAAF doctrine. This was 
primarily due to the technical advances in bombardment aviation as represented in the 
Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10. 
 
During these exercises, observation aviation appeared woefully obsolete in 
performance, as did pursuit aviation in speed characteristics. Since new 
bombardment aircraft possesses speed above two hundred miles per hour, 
any intercepting or supporting aircraft must possess greater speed 
characteristics if they are to perform their missions. In the case of pursuit 
aviation, this increase of speed must be so great as to make it doubtful 
whether pursuit aircraft can be efficiently or safely operated either 





 These may be solid conclusions based on production models in 1933, but if there 
is one constant about the aircraft industry during the twentieth century it is rapid 
technological advancement. While the B-9, with a maximum speed of 186 mph and a 
ceiling of 22,500 feet, and the B-10, with a maximum speed of 200 mph and ceiling of 
25,200 feet, may have outperformed operational pursuit craft in 1933, pursuit aviation 
was not standing still.
35
 The introduction of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress in 1935, 
with a maximum speed of 302 mph and maximum ceiling of 36,600 feet, may have 
                                                 
34
 Gen. Westover, quoted in Craven and Cate vol. 1, 65. 
35
 Jackson, 51 and 246. 
  Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.24 
 
upped the ante, but it did not force pursuit out of the game.
36
 The failure of USAAF 
leadership to recognize that technology progresses much more rapidly than doctrine can 
incorporate change resulted in a significant disconnect between prewar doctrine and its 
application. One needed only to look at the speed and altitude records achieved during 
the 1930s to see what was on the way to face off against American bombers. Speed 
records for single seat aircraft went from 294 mph in 1932 to 351 mph in 1935 and would 
jump to 468 mph in 1939.
37
 Altitude records would go from 43,978 feet in 1932 to 
56,049 feet in 1938.
38
 While these records may have been set by prototypes and 
specialized aircraft, today‟s prototype is tomorrow‟s production model and it is beholden 
upon policy makers to recognize this fact and plan accordingly. 
  
Blinded by the B-17 
 One cannot overemphasize the impact of the B-17 upon American bombardment 
doctrine. This aircraft, coupled with the Norden M-1 bombsight, provided the means 
which, in the minds of air planners at the time, would allow for strategic bombardment to 
come into reality. In order to justify these programs there again existed a certain amount 
of subterfuge on the part of the Army Air Corps as the B-17, an aircraft which at its core 
was a purely offensive weapon, was sold to both the public and politicians as the best 
means to achieve coastal defense. “As late as 1939 the impression persisted, outside of 
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the Army as well as in, that the Air Corps bombers were being built purely for defense.”39 
The strategy worked and the first 13 B-17s were delivered to the Army between January 
and August of 1937.
40
  
 With anywhere from ten to thirteen machine guns mounted on the B-17, 
depending on the model, the existence of such a heavily-armed aircraft reinforced the 
already established beliefs of bomber self-defense and bomber invincibility. Though this 
concept did result in a lack of an escort fighter during the early missions over Europe, 
prewar planners were not naïve enough to believe that even a B-17 could survive an 
onslaught of enemy fighter opposition alone. The use of formation flying, which allowed 
for the overlapping of gunfire, provided a stronger defensive network surrounding the 
aircraft.
41
 This practice raises some very important points. First, the acceptance of 
formation flying can be seen as an acknowledgement of the advancements in air defense 
technology and an expression of a fear that the bomber may not be invincible after all. If 
planners were willing to go this far, then why not push for the development of an escort 
fighter as an indispensible component of the bomber offensive prior to massive losses 
over Europe? Secondly, formation flying may have provided a much more efficient 
defense against fighter aircraft, but what of anti-aircraft artillery? Clustering the bombers 
together would greatly assist the ground defense; not only would the probability of hitting 
a target in the general area increase but there would also be less space between targets, 
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requiring less time for sighting of subsequent targets, hence allowing more rounds to be 
fired per minute. 
 But the central problem inherent in formation flying deals with space and time. If 
you are advocating a „precision‟ bombing strategy then it is implied that area bombing is 
not desired nor an effective means to achieve the desired ends.  Truly „precision‟ targets 
were expected to be small (100 feet x 100) and accuracy even under controlled conditions 
was difficult to achieve.
42
   
 There exists at 23,000 feet a finite number of locations within which an aircraft 
can release its bomb and have it successfully land on target, and the smaller the target the 
fewer such places there are. At this time there were no GPS or laser guidance systems; 
successful delivery of ordinance was reliant upon properly choosing when to release the 
bomb to allow gravity to bring it to its desired destination. The Norden bombsight existed 
to calculate when this point in space and time had been reached, and even if human error 
did not affect the bomb run such precise computations only counted for the lead aircraft 
doing the calculations. Combined with the practice of „dropping on the leader‟, formation 
flying was not a means to achieve true single-shot precision strikes. It was, in practice, 
“the area bombing of selected industrial targets and their immediate surroundings.”43 To 
achieve true precision bombing the attacking aircraft would have to approach the target 
single file, calculating their aiming points independently. Due to defensive necessity and 
the reliance on probability to achieve a precision strike individual approaches were not 
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possible and the result was that each aircraft had the final location of their bomb drop 
dictated by their position in formation. When the lead plane, whose bombardier had 
calculated when to release his bomb load to achieve a hit, dropped its load the other 
aircraft in the formation did as well and it was not physically possible for their bombs to 
hit the same location. 
 If the formation was the 
size of a football field and the 
aircraft all dropped their bombs at 
the same time then the bomb 
pattern would be the size of a 
football field, and formations 
were often much larger than this. 
“For example, in March 1943 the 
54-bomber box was about 1 1/3 
miles wide, spread 2500 feet in  
44
  altitude and 1/3 mile from 
front to back.”45 The only way that adding bombers could increase the probability of a hit 
on such small targets would be to bomb single file or in pairs, not in wide defensive 
formations. What the air planners had really devised was a means to achieve localized 
area bombing, though it was publicly claimed to be a technique that could achieve 
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precision strikes to destroy the enemy‟s productive capacity with a minimum of collateral 
damage. The B-17 reinforced the defensible bomber theory which resulted in both the 
delaying of an effective escort fighter and the inability to achieve true „precision‟.  
  USAAF doctrine, according to one of its creators General Haywood Hansell, was 
“a concept developed through logic, map problems, and war games.”46 It was not the 
result of experience but rather calculations formed in an office with a calculator and 
probability tables based on limited testing data. Major Harold George, during the first 
session of his Air Force course in 1935, told his students: “From today on much that we 
shall study will require us to start with nothing more than an acknowledged truth and then 
attempt, by the utilization of common sense and logic, to evolve a formula that we 
believe will stand up under the crucial test of actual conditions.”47 While the creation of a 
new technological doctrine is an amazing feat and itself worthy of praise, the lack of 
thorough testing calls the motives of air planners into question. “In teaching the subject 
of air force employment, the instructors at the Tactical School solved the problem by 
ignoring the actual strategical demands of the United States and by discussing pure 
theory.”48 When boiled down to its most basic level, the doctrine developed at ACTS was 
one of assumption based upon assumption. While the lack of a conflict to test these new 
ideas was not the fault of the minds at ACTS, blind faith in untested doctrine and an 
inability to accept outside criticism solely belong to them. “Although it is not surprising 
that the Air Corps theorists developed such ideas in the absence of actual tests, what is 
                                                 
46
 Hansell, 4. 
47
 Maj. George, Quoted in Finney, 28 
48
 Greer, 53 
  Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.29 
 
remarkable is the tenacity with which they held to them even when these ideas were 
discredited by the experience of war.”49 Resistance to doctrinal revision when confronted 
with its operational shortcomings was a result of both bureaucratic rigidity and 
uncompromising ideology. By the end of the 1930s, air planners could argue their 
convictions with such fervor, tenacity, and statistical evidence that they eagerly awaited 
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Chapter 2: Making It Official 
Early doctrinal developers knew that their ideas were outside of the accepted 
norms of the military system, and they chose to wait for the proper moment to present 
their new vision of the power of strategic bombardment. When the time came it provided 
an opportunity for airmen to codify their beliefs into a single document, a type of 
„Bombardment Constitution‟.  
AWPD/1: Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces was produced in 
response to President Roosevelt‟s request of July 9th, 1941 which called for Army and 
Navy war production estimates. As it was almost impossible to answer this request 
“without asking fundamental questions about what the Army Air Forces were supposed 
to do in Europe,”50 this document went beyond simply discussing hardware and 
manpower needs and became the vessel by which the doctrine developed at ACTS was 
presented and sold to decision makers in Washington for its application in a future 
conflict.  “It marked the first time that airmen in the Army Air Forces were permitted to 
do their own planning, thus it was a critically important step in their move towards 
independence.”51 General Henry „Hap‟ Arnold, commander of the Army Air Corps, had 
fought against the idea of a simple air annex to the War Department‟s overall report, and 
his tenacity paid off.
52
 The idea that only airmen were truly qualified to deal with matters 
of aviation, a concept championed by Mitchell after World War I, had come one step 
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closer to reality. “Tacitly, though not legally, the AAF staff had assumed on this occasion 
a position of equality with those of the other arms.”53 The team that was created consisted 
of former instructors from the Air Corps Tactical School: Lt. Col. Harold L. George, Lt. 
Col. Kenneth Walker, Major Haywood S. Hansell, and Major Laurence S. Kuter. As 
Hansell later wrote, “We realized instinctively that a major milestone had been 
reached.”54 The plan would be created between August 5th and August 12th 1941 in the 
Munitions Building in Washington D.C.
55
 
 “The only restriction given George was that his proposal had to conform to 
RAINBOW 5, the overall war plan agreed to by the British and American staffs during 
the “ABC” discussions in May 1941.”56 It was agreed that Germany constituted the 
greatest threat to the Allies and her defeat would be the primary objective in a future war. 
Once a potential enemy is known it becomes easier to develop a method of attack. What 
is amazing in this case is that an elaborate method of attack had been formulated, 
clarified, and fully accepted by airmen for the proper use of bombardment long before the 
enemy had become clear. 
 The document itself is fascinating, not only for its codification of and blind faith 
in doctrine as developed at ACTS but also the predominate role given to this untested 
theory in the overall war strategy. The purpose of air power in a future war with Germany 
was to “wage a sustained air offensive against German military power” and to “support a 
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final offensive, if it becomes necessary to invade the continent.”57 After struggling with 
the Navy throughout the 1930s over the issue of coastal defense,
58
 the Air Corps was now 
claiming, within an official document, that it could bring about Germany‟s surrender 
through bombing alone without the assistance of the other two established branches. This 
was not a requirements plan for joint action, but rather a document that focused solely on 
what was needed for the USAAF to destroy the enemy. Not only was it a go-it-alone war 
plan, it also disregarded many of the lessons already learned by other nations in two years 
of modern warfare. “In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded 
that… it would be feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany by day.”59 The belief 
that they could accomplish the complete destruction of Germany‟s economy and 
therefore bring about its capitulation without the other branches of the armed forces is a 
wonderful example of the quasi-religious belief that airmen had in their new weapons and 
doctrine.  
 It is important to note that there were no economic or industrial experts among the 
four officers who would establish industrial target priorities for the bombers. Haywood 
Hansell made much of his time in the newly created Strategic Air Intelligence Division in 
1940 and of his trip to England to gather intelligence of German industry, but he was not 
                                                 
57
 Air War Planning Division. AWPD/1: Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces. (Washington 
D.C.: War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, August 12, 1941. Air Force Historical 
Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112), tab 2, 1. (Underlined by the author for emphasis.) 
58
 The coastal defense argument, as pointed out earlier, was and still is considered by many to have been a 
ruse. As Greer so succinctly put it, “The just suspicion grew that the Air Corps had unlimited desires for 
ever-larger planes and that the defense argument was simply an expedient for obtaining the biggest planes 
then available.” (Greer, 93.) 
59
 Craven and Cate vol. 1, 149. 
  Seyer, Sean, 2009, UMSL, p.33 
 
a technical expert in the field.
60
 “What he knew was enough to convince Hal George and 
the others that their plan, whatever it turned out to be, would be based upon a 
theoretically and practically sound approach to targets in the German economy and war 
machine.”61  
 One of the key assumptions upon which AWPD/1 was based was the state of the 
German economy. Looking at the situation in Europe from an American perspective, the 
Air War Planning Division team saw a system stretched to its limits that could easy be 
pushed over the edge by applying pressure to certain defined areas: 
 
 Nearly 17 million men are directly engaged in this war, to the exclusion of 
all normal civil pursuits and production. Hence, there is a very heavy drain 
on the social and economic structure of the state. Destruction of that 






This presumption neither takes into account the impact of foreign workers nor the 
elasticity inherent within the German economic system. It was assumed that Germany 
was at full production simply because if America was in that situation it would be, and is 
more the projection of the American system upon Nazi Germany than reality. According 
to Gaston, this was largely due to Hansell, who “knew far more than they had any right to 
expect, and less than any of them could imagine.”63 
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Proposed Target Systems 
 Target priorities consisted of three major systems: electrical power, 
transportation, and oil. The planners also included morale which was to be a target only if 
the enemy needed a final nudge after the destruction of the first three target systems. 
Electricity was seen as the backbone of an industrialized society, and fifty electrical 
targets were selected. “They are precision targets. A typical plant covers an area about 
500 ft. x 500 ft. The British estimate that about 17 hits in that area will guarantee 
destruction of the plant.”64 The Luftwaffe itself was listed as an “intermediate objective, 
whose accomplishment may be essential to the accomplishment of the principle 
objectives.”65 It is interesting that the enemy‟s air force was not considered a primary 
target. This illustrates the depth to which the invincible bomber theory had taken root 
among airmen and also the desire to remove themselves from the counter-air role 
assigned to aviation since World War One.  
  AWDP/1 claimed that “the German railways are working at capacity.”66 Though 
the network covered the entire extent of Germany it was still seen as a viable target due 
to perceived strain. Forty-seven transportation weak points were selected, consisting of 
both railway targets (marshalling yards and bridges) and inland waterway targets (ship 
elevators, locks, and harbors).
67
 The importance of the German transportation system is 
acutely understood within AWPD/1, unfortunately this insight would not return until the 
very end of operations in Europe. “It is estimated that disruption of the marshalling yards 
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of the Ruhr for 24 hours sets back the production of the Ruhr about two weeks.”68 What 
the planners failed to do was take this a step further; why would this disruption have such 
an effect on production? The answer lies in Germany‟s dependence on coal, not oil. This 
gap in the understanding of German industry can largely be attributed to the projection of 
the American industrial system upon Germany and would prove to be one of the failures 
of prewar doctrinal development.  
 Oil was seen as indispensible to the German system. “German transportation, the 
German Air Force, the German Navy, and German industry all are dependent upon oil.”69 
Note the exclusion of the Wehrmacht from this list, and postwar analysis would show 
that only the Luftwaffe was entirely dependent upon oil. According to AWPD/1: 
About 60% of aviation gasoline comes from synthetic production in 
Germany proper. Eighty per cent of this production comes from 27 plants. 
These plants vary from 400 to 1,000 miles from England. They are easily 
distinguishable in daylight, and they are susceptible to destruction by 
bombing. They are precision targets.  
About 22% of the oil for aviation gasoline comes from Rumania. It is 
refined in Rumania and is moved primarily by water transportation up the 
Danube to Germany. Success in the oil venture might necessitate 
operating against the Danube to stop this flow. Hence, the importance of 
retaining bases in Asia Minor or Syria.” 70  
 
 This section is important in two respects. First, it illustrates a lack of 
understanding of the German crude and synthetic oil industries. While aviation fuel was 
indeed dependent upon synthetic production through either the Fischer-Tropsch process 
or Bergius hydrogenation method, it was to a much greater extent than believed. In fact, 
aviation fuel was almost entirely reliant upon synthetic production due to the high octane 
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 Also, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Germany 
knew of its precarious position in regards to crude oil supplies and had adjusted its 
economic base accordingly. “Less than 15 per cent of their aviation fuel and only a fourth 
of all their oil products made early in 1944 came from crude oil. The rest came from coal 
as did also nearly all of Germany‟s rubber, explosives, and other war materials.”72 This of 
course raises the larger question of just how critical Ploesti was to the German economy. 
 The doctrine developed at the Air Corps Tactical School saw its culmination in 
AWPD/1. It was believed that by destroying electrical, transportation, and oil targets a 
wholesale disruption of the German economy would result and the industrial web would 
crumble due to the loss of these few vital strands holding it together. It is important to 
note that of these three systems electrical power would never become an actual target 
during the war and transportation, until the very end of the war in Europe, would play 
second fiddle to oil. 
  
Plan Feasibility and Requirements 
 Once the mission of bombardment had been presented the planners were able to 
address the purpose of the document, the hardware and manpower requirements to 
achieve victory. But first a vital question had to be addressed: was the plan possible? 
Would the bombers make it through? In reference to German fighter opposition it was 
recognized that the B-17 could not outrun the more agile interceptors. “The B-17s rely 
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upon speed, altitude, and deception. However, they have been intercepted, and each time 
the ME 109s were capable of flying above them and of overtaking them.”73 It was due to 
this that a reversal occurred within AWPD/1 and a call for a long-range escort fighter was 
added into the document. Aircraft take time to develop, test, and manufacture, and to 
finally recognize the need for such a fighter in 1941 calls into question the earlier 
motivations of bombardment planners at ACTS. In their desire to establish a mission 
apart from that of pursuit and observation forced upon them by the military establishment 
the Air Corps failed to produce a well-rounded, all inclusive doctrine during the 1930s. 
Hansell would later see this as a significant weakness within ACTS doctrine. “Failure to 
see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School‟s major 
shortcomings.”74  
  The deadliness of anti-aircraft artillery was also recognized, though the solution 
provided was not a practical one. “It is necessary for bombers to keep maneuvering to 
avoid being shot down, even at 18,000 feet. The Germans use radio predictions, and fire 
with amazing accuracy, even through an overcast.”75 The Norden bombsight required a 
steady bomb run, in fact the pilot lost control of the aircraft when the bombardier was 
setting up for the approach. Due to the technical advances to bring about „precision‟ 
attacks it was not possible to maneuver for up to five minutes during the approach to the 
target.
76
 Because of the doctrine of precision bombing, which was a result of the 
industrial web theory, air crews were, in essence, sitting ducks over these heavily 
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defended target areas. That a call for an escort fighter and a countermeasure for anti-
aircraft fire, however superficial, were included within AWPD/1 demonstrates that when 
push came to shove air planners themselves were not truly convinced of the invincibility 
of the bomber. Despite these acknowledgements of the reality of German defenses, 
somehow the conclusion was reached that the mission was possible. “Consideration of all 
these factors leads to the conclusion, that by deploying large numbers of aircraft with 
high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude, it is feasible to make deep 
penetrations into Germany in daylight.”77 The argument is not convincing, and it would 
be severely tested in the skies over Schweinfurt and Regensburg. 
 In order to justify force requirements the AWPD team had to present the logic 
behind their calculations, and to do so they looked to U.S. bombing range data from June 
through December of 1940. First, the assumed altitude of attack was set at 20,000 feet 
and the target size was set at 100 feet x 100 feet. The current American range error of 220 
feet and structure error of 275 feet were factored into the equation and, to allow for 
combat conditions, the current bombing error was multiplied by 2.25.  Then the single 
shot probability (SSP), the probability that at least one bomb would hit the target, was 
calculated at .012. Based on this data it was determined how many aircraft, and therefore 
would many bomb drops, would be required to ensure destruction of the target. “SSP of 
.012 results in a requirement of 220 bombs (planes) to secure one hit. To secure one hit 
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against target of selected size – 220 airplanes (bombers) are required.”78 There were some 
very important preconceptions which went into this probability formulation: 
  
Assumption – one hit of proper size bomb on target should affect its 
destruction. The majority of targets will be susceptible of (to) destruction 
by bombs of the smaller sizes (1000#, 500#). One hit of such size bomb 
indicates a high probability of other hits from remaining bombs released 
from plane simultaneously. Hence, for purposes of calculation, one bomb 




 Equating one bomb on target with that target‟s destruction would cause immense 
frustration not only for planners but also for the men who were sent back over heavily-
defended targets again and again. The idea that either a 500 lb. or 1,000 lb. bomb would 
be sufficient against targets with hardened defenses proved false. The most amazing 
aspect of all this is that there were no trials against dummy targets within the United 
States prior to the war to support these assertions. There is no record of tests against old 
or mock refineries and electric powerhouses, nor discussion of bombardment tests upon 
rail centers during peacetime to demonstrate the feasibility of ACTS doctrine.  
 The amount of planes required for the destruction of the target based on these 
calculations is phenomenal. With 36 aircraft per group, it was determined that, after 
factoring in the 2.25 factor for wartime error, it would require 30 group missions to 
destroy the target, or 1,080 effective sorties. George and his team were not only calling 
for a total of 98 groups (6,834 bombardment aircraft total)
80
 to test their industrial web 
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theory, but also the industrial, economic, and human requirements to put them in the air. 
However, the most chilling aspect of AWPD/1 is its discussion of expected attrition rates. 
“Current W.D. attrition rates (20% per month loss in airplanes by all units except 
operational training units were (sic) 3% prevails) applied throughout.”81 With 6,834 total 
aircraft called for this would be a loss of 1,367 aircraft per month. With an average crew 
of ten per bomber this would mean an expected casualty rate of 13,670 men per month. 
Men with families and futures. And this plan was accepted without radical modification 
by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General George Marshall. Hansell, writing later, 
would claim a higher expected rate than that. “Anticipated attrition called for a monthly 
replacement rate of some 2,133 aircraft.”82 The fact that that this plan was sold to the 
public as an efficient means to wage war against Germany and that it was not 
significantly challenged speaks to the power of prewar notions about the possibilities of 
airpower. 
  
From Paper to Reality 
 President Roosevelt came to see the diplomatic leverage that could be gained 
from what is perceived to be a powerful air force after the Munich Crisis in September of 
1938. William Bullitt, Ambassador to France, wrote to Roosevelt on September 20
th
 
stating that “If you have enough airplanes you don‟t have to go to Berchtesgaden.”83 
Though FDR became acutely aware of the position of air power within modern 
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diplomacy, this does not mean that he was immediately sold on strategic bombing as 
developed at ACTS during the 1930s. As Sherry points out, “He formed no alliance with 
the bomber enthusiasts, probably as yet unfamiliar with their ideas.”84 The pivotal event 
for the realization of the Air Corp‟s vision was Roosevelt‟s May 16, 1940 address before 
a joint session of Congress. After painting the picture of a highly vulnerable America 
because of the aviation advances of the Axis Powers, FDR proceeded to call for a 50,000 
aircraft force along with the industrial capacity to reinforce it completely every year. To 
pay not only for the material but also the necessary training and logistical costs he 
requested a total appropriation of $896,000,000.
85
 Though this was not the first 
appropriations request for war materiel, and by no means the last, it was a firm and public 
acknowledgement by the President that, in his belief, airpower in some form would play a 
decisive role in the next conflict. Having been a Navy man, it would have been 
understandable had Roosevelt called for a predominately naval expansion. The fact that 
he did not is very telling. Roosevelt recognized that in modern warfare the airplane 
provided something in abundance that was difficult to attain through conventional land 
and sea forces. “Defense cannot be static. Defense must grow and change from day to 
day. Defense must be dynamic and flexible, an expression of the vital forces of the nation 
and of its resolute will to meet whatever challenge the future may hold.”86 Nothing 
embodied flexibility, nor allowed for the offensive defense alluded to by Roosevelt, like 
airpower.  
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 With the public endorsement of the President and the financial backing of 
Congress a large bureaucratic system emerged to implement the strategic vision of air 
planners. Not only was there an immense desire for aircraft but also for the crews to fly 
them. Civilian trainers at private air schools contracted with the Army and “Air Corps 
personnel jumped from 20,503 on 1 July 1939 to 152,569 just two years later.”87 In 
discussing his training to become a B-24 pilot John J. Hibbits portrayed a program that 
focused on producing quality crews as rapidly as possible. Through his journey from 
Preflight Training to Primary, from Basic to Advanced, and lastly to B-24 Training, it is 
clear that there existed a rush to get these boys flying. Just the sheer number of schools in 
the training process shows the seriousness and thoroughness demanded by the Air Corps 
even in times of imminent hostilities. Hibbits makes one extremely important point: 
while rigorously educated in the principles of aerodynamics, meteorology, navigation, 
formation flying, and air and naval identification there was no indoctrination of the 
theory underlying the tactics. “There was as little discussion of theory as possible, while 
practical facts were poured into our brains every minute.”88 Those putting the plan into 
action were not trained in the intricacies of the doctrine underlying their missions; they 
were to carry them out, not understand the reasoning behind them. Craven and Cate point 
out that training “emphasized the importance of formation flying at all altitudes, of 
accuracy in bombing and gunnery, and of the development of well-integrated combat 
crews.”89  
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 Before Pearl Harbor American airmen had developed a plan for the effective use 
of the new air weapon and had convinced their superiors of the soundness of it. President 
Roosevelt became convinced of the necessity of airpower due to events in Europe and it 
was through his demands that air planners were allowed the means to bring their vision of 
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Chapter 3: The True Nature of the 
Enemy Economy 
 
 In order to properly analyze the effects of American strategic bombing doctrine it 
is necessary to take a look at its intended target, the German economy. Only when these 
two pieces of the puzzle are interlocked can one step back and appreciate the final 
picture, the results of the American bombing campaign. This raises the question of just 
how important was Ploesti to the Nazi war machine. Was it, as many then and now have 
argued, the foundation upon which the German military depended? Did this reliance 
carry over to the German economy? It is important to remember that American doctrine 
was aimed at the economic foundations of the enemy‟s military, not the military itself. In 
order to properly address the importance of Ploesti we must first look at the German war 
economy and specifically the role of petroleum in it. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter the American view of the German economy 
was of one operating under heavy strain, stretched to the limit and teetering on the edge. 
It was viewed as being in such dire straits that only six months of bombardment would be 
needed to bring about its collapse, and with it the capitulation of the German military. 
Yet, the German economy was able to support the army until 1945. Why the 
discrepancy? Going against the stereotype of efficiency, Germany‟s economy was never 
completely harnessed for war. “While the German economy was approaching its basic 
limitations in mid-1944, it never attained its full war potential.”90 This was due to the 
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German economy never truly being put on a total war footing. According to historian 
Alan S. Milward, “In 1942 consumers‟ expenditures, in terms of 1939 Reichsmarks, 
stood practically equal to 1937 when the civilian population was almost the same size.”91 
The Nazi regime was determined to produce both guns and butter as long as possible to 
placate the population.  
 The economic initiatives under first Fritz Todt and then Albert Speer were able to 
wring increased production from an economy under siege by introducing new methods of 
efficiency and limiting production models. Many of the reforms enacted, such as double 
and triple shifts, were already in effect in Britain and America. This modernizing of the 
German economy had an immediate and pronounced effect upon German war production. 
“Despite the damage wrought by air attack and territorial losses, and despite the general 
drop in production in the second half of 1944, total industrial output for the year was the 
highest of the war.”92 One can only wonder what would have happened if Germany had 
developed a total war economy prior to 1939. 
 It is interesting that when one studies the German economy the discussion 
invariably gravitates towards Germany‟s raw material situation, in particular that of oil. Is 
this due to oil‟s central place within the German industrial system or more so because of 
the Allied bombing campaign against it? “With the exception of synthetic oil, basic 
industrial materials were not major targets in the combined air offensive against 
Germany.”93 War planners projected many aspects of the American economy and war 
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experience into their understanding of Germany, was oil yet another victim of this 
phenomena? Has oil maintained its historical status as a critical economic target system 
due to it actually being one or due to the effort expended in lives and material in 
attacking it?  
 On September 9, 1936, the Four Year Plan was implemented in Germany under 
the auspices of Hitler‟s second in command, Hermann Goering. The purpose of this 
measure was to bolster Germany‟s raw material production capabilities, especially in the 
areas of synthetic fuel and rubber. 1,261 million Reichsmarks were set aside for the 
program and “one-half of the total investment undertaken in connection with the Four 
Year Plan was related to the production of synthetic fuel.”94 The belief was that Germany 
would be capable of supporting military operations within four years without requiring 
raw material imports which, if World War One was any guide, would be cut off due to a 
blockade of the continent. “Capacity for synthetic oil production was increased more than 
twofold (in) 1936 and 1939. But the 1939 output was 45 per cent below what had been 
envisioned.”95 Though unable to achieve the desired growth, investment along these lines 
did not stop with the beginning of hostilities in 1939: 
Synthetic rubber production was raised from 5,000 tons to 134,000 tons 
per annum between 1939 and 1944; the latter was adequate to cover all 
requirements. In the case of oil, synthetic production was raised from 1.3 
million tons in 1938 to an annual rate of 6 million tons by early 1944, 
while crude oil production was expanded (through the development of 
Austrian fields) from 0.6 to 2.0 million tons. Together with the Rumanian 
and Hungarian supplies of about 2.5 million tons, these were adequate to 
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achieve the needs of the armed forces, whose pattern of consumption was, 




Oil and the German Military 
 The belief that the German‟s were heavily dependent upon oil is mostly the result 
of a serious misconception of the German army both then and now. With the 
development of blitzkrieg warfare and its reliance on mechanized units, the impression 
was purposely made upon the world that the entire German military was a modern force 
powered by the internal combustion engine. This belief does not stand up under scrutiny. 
In fact, mechanized and motorized divisions “generally composed well under 25 percent 
of the divisions deployed by the Wehrmacht.”97 The small number of motorized divisions 
is astonishing when one looks at the composition of the German forces during the 
invasion of Poland. “Of the total of 102 divisions, only the 14 mobile divisions were 
completely motorized.”98 This is a long way from the perception, created by images 
played in newsreels around the globe, of a fully modern and mobile army pouring across 
the border. The tip of the sword may have been motorized for quick trusts and piercing 
attacks, but the bulk of the German land force would rely on that ancient means of 
locomotion, the horse. “The standard German infantry division (1939 pattern) required 
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anything from 4,077 to 6,033 horses to move.”99 Knowing that they lacked the means to 
fuel a fully mechanized military, German leaders did not create one. “Of the 35.6 billion 
Reichsmarks to be spent between 1937 and 1941, less than 5 per cent (4.7 percent) was 
earmarked for tanks and motor vehicles. By contrast, guns, artillery and ammunition were 
allocated 32 per cent of the budget.”100 The main exception to this was of course the 
Luftwaffe, which was wholly reliant on aviation-grade fuel to be of any use whatsoever. 
 Total petroleum production in 1940 within Germany and its occupied territories 
(excluding Romania) was 3,963,000 tons. Though total consumption amounted to 
5,856,000 tons, the total produced within the Reich more than covered the 3,005,000 tons 
necessary for the armed forces. In 1943, when the Combined Bomber Offensive began, 
Greater Germany was producing 6,563,000 tons of petroleum with a military requirement 
of 4,762,000 tons.
101
 Germany may not have been able to produce enough petroleum 
within her borders to meet all requirements but she was able to meet her military needs. 
The system was designed for short, decisive wars that would produce, and were based 
upon, an ebb and flow of petrol stocks. Fuel stocks from conquests were no small factor 
and, though not sources of continuous supply, must also be factored into the equation.
102
 
The invasion of the U.S.S.R. does not appear initially to have upset the oil situation in 
regards to domestic and industrial use. Jensen points out that, “with the exception of one 
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million tons of oil delivered to Germany, the rest of the Rumanian oil production went 
directly to the front in the East.”103 This fact forces one to draw the conclusion that 
industry, and therefore the German economy, was not reliant upon Romanian crude. This 
source was necessary to allow for extensive military activities, such as Operation 
Barbarossa. Only when operations had to be maintained over an extended period of time 
did fuel stocks become an issue. 
 The predominant school of thought is that Germany‟s oil situation was precarious, 
bordering on crisis, even at the earliest stages of the war and that she struggled 
throughout. According to Klein, “stocks and current production of oil products…could 
guarantee consumption requirements for a period of only three to six months.”104 The 
question then becomes, like so many aspects of this study, one of perception. To someone 
living in a highly mechanized, oil based society, the level of stocks discussed by Klein 
would cause severe worry and nervousness. To someone from a less industrialized nation, 
or one that had an industrial base supported by a different type of energy, this supply may 
appear more than sufficient to meet projected needs. Jensen portrays Germany as a nation 
deep in the grip of oil addiction living hand to mouth, with the shadow of painful 
withdraw ever-present. Tooze does see a reliance upon oil within Germany, but also 
recognizes that her infrastructure and requirements were much different than those of her 
opponents. As has already been mentioned, the USSBS team studying the effects of 
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bombing on the German war economy believed that, for the most part, Germany‟s supply 
of oil met her limited needs. 
  
A Coal-Based Economy 
 If the military was not as oil-hungry as has been popularly understood, was there 
a dependence upon oil within Germany‟s civilian and industrial sectors? The Reichsbahn, 
the German rail system, operated almost entirely on coal; apart from lubrication oil, 
petroleum-based fuel was noticeably absent in its daily operations. With the vast majority 
of industrial transport by rail, the necessity of oil for logistical purposes was largely 
removed. As far as civilian consumption, though it was indeed Hitler‟s dream to create a 
nation of motorized citizens, a rabid desire for consumer petrol was never brought into 
existence within the Reich. Tooze points to the high entry costs of the automobile, even 
after Opel‟s price drop in the early 1930s to 1,450 Reichsmarks, as the main reason 
Hitler‟s vision did not materialize.105 This amount was still a sizable chunk of income for 
the average worker, and the Volkswagen project was unable to meet consumer demand 
due to the war.
106
 This left the luxury of the automobile in the hands of the upper and 
upper-middle classes, and though they had the funds available to purchase fuel such a 
small market could not affect oil supplies to a great extent. In 1933, the ratio of 
automobiles to Germans was 1 per 90.
107
 This increased within the following years, 
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reaching 1 per every 47 people by 1937.
108
 Though automobile ownership did increase 
during the 1930s it was far from the American ratio of 1 car per 3.5 people in 1933.
109
 It 
is curious that Hitler would deliberately try to create a situation of dependence upon a 
substance in limited supply, but one can say the same thing about late twentieth-century 
America. 
 What of the other pillar of modern industrial economies, electricity? “Electric 
power was derived almost exclusively from coal.”110 This resource which, according to 
AWPD/1, all industry relied upon was itself wholly reliant upon the German coal industry 
and the transportation network that delivered this precious commodity. Electrical power 
would be reduced to fourth priority by U.S. planners, after transportation and before oil, 
in the follow-up to AWPD/1, AWPD/42: Requirements for Air Ascendancy, presented 
September 9, 1942.
111
 Going much more in depth than its predecessor, it would 
ultimately not be approved due to its inability to persuade Admiral King.
112 “The combat 
experience to date was still too meager to provide a realistic yardstick for bombing 
accuracy and for the size of the force required. However, the computations were still 
based on the old tables of probability, which were in turn based on independent sighting 
operations.”113 It would appear that the Navy, dealing with its own situation on two fronts 
and after having observed limited air success, was not about to take another leap of faith 
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based on charts and graphs. Instead the target priorities of the Committee of Operational 
Analysts, which was created by order of Gen. Arnold on December 9, 1942, would be 
accepted. Electrical power and transportation would not make their list. The COA 
believed that these systems were “too widely dispersed” to allow for the practical 
application of force.
114
 Why was it so hard for the Allies to understand the basic 
foundations of the German economy? Oil was considered a valid strategic target from 
AWPD/1 to the war‟s end, and this fact strongly supports the notion that Americans could 
not completely grasp the concept that an industrialized system may not mirror their own. 
The German economy, though often achieving the same results, was based on an entirely 
different foundation: 
 
Wartime Germany was a chemical empire built on coal, air and water. 
Eighty-four and a half per cent of her aviation fuel, 85 per cent of her 
motor gasoline, all but a fraction of 1 per cent of her rubber, 100 per cent 
of the concentrated nitric acid, basic component of all military explosives, 
and 99 per cent of her equally important methanol were synthesized from 




 History has shown us that nations have a tendency to develop that which they 
process in abundance; they do not create an elaborate infrastructure based on materials 
which are foreign or sparse. America had massive amounts of crude and the means to 
exploit it in the twentieth century; therefore she developed an extensive oil system to 
complement her existing coal base. This allowed for a thorough exploitation of the 
internal combustion engine. Germany was not blessed with large amounts of oil reserves 
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and neither was most of the continent of Europe, therefore she developed a coal-intensive 
system complemented by the limited supplies of oil available. Germany even turned to 
coal as a means to fulfill her petroleum needs, utilizing an intricate system of synthetic oil 
plants. Due to their reliance upon coal they were situated close to coal deposits, which 




         
117
 
         
 The synthetic industry produced such vital components as oil, nitrogen, and 
rubber, and was entirely dependent upon coal. The ratio of tons of coal to finished tons of 
synthetic gasoline was 6:1.
118
 This may seem staggering, but German coal production 
from 1938-1939 was 240 million tons, which was increased to 340 million by 1942-
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 Though this is a massive number, one must take in to account the demand. Coal 
permeated every aspect of German life and coal shortages had the potential to be felt 
system-wide; oil shortages would affect a much narrower and primarily military sector. 
Various grades of coal were used in almost all levels of manufacturing, kept the 
locomotives of the Reichsbahn moving, heated the homes of the population in winter, 
were burned to generate electricity, and were the primary component in the vital synthetic 
industry. If the desire of strategic planners was to target the absolutely fundamental 
pillars of the German economy the focus should have been on coal and the transportation 




What Good is a Plane without Fuel? 
 As mentioned previously, there was one area were oil products, particularly 
synthetic oil, were vital: aviation fuel. “Between 11 September and 19 September (1944), 
the Allies succeeded in stopping completely all aviation spirit production in Germany 
except for one day.”121 Though the Allied oil campaign did succeed in causing massive 
aviation fuel shortages, can this be considered a „strategic‟ result? According to the 
USSBS Oil Division Final Report, the air offensive succeeded because it “effectively 
stopped oil production with decisive military consequences.”122 It is the consensus of 
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historians that the constriction of aviation fuel stocks and the consequent defeat of the 
Luftwaffe were the primary accomplishments of the USAAF in World War Two. While 
such results are laudable and no doubt contributed to the defeat of the German military, it 
is not the total capitulation resulting from an aerially-imposed economic breakdown 
envisioned by American air theorists in the interwar years. 
 Germany did not create a military and industrial juggernaut and leave it 
defenseless against air attack. In fact, due to its central position on the continent, 
Germany developed one of the most extensive and intricate systems of active and passive 
air defenses on the planet. Active defense can be divided into two main groups, fighter 
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery (flak). Passive defense consists of various means of 
confusion and concealment, such as the use of smoke screens, dummy installations, 
barrage balloons, camouflage, and radar countermeasures. All of these were used to 
defend the oil refineries at Ploesti. Smoke screens were considered “one of their most 
successful camouflage measures” and would be used extensively by the Germans.123  
 German fighter aircraft production continued to increase throughout the war but a 
lack of fuel and pilots nullified these gains. 1943 production was almost twice as high as 
1942, and 1944 saw nearly three times the level achieved in the early months of 1942.
124
 
The German fighters, flying the by then dated Focke-Wolfe 190s and Messerschmitt 
109s, did have to develop new tactics to overcome the range difference between their 
guns and the .50 caliber guns of the B-17 and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. “The 
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attack from the front, high front, or low front all with low speed was the most effective of 
all.”125 The Luftwaffe was neutralized as a fighting force through a battle of attrition; 
forced to defend multiple targets it was bled slowly by first the bomber crews and then 
the long-range escort fighter. The coup de grâce was the constriction of the fuel supply, 
virtually eliminating training of replacement pilots.  
  
The Role of Flak 
 Flak defenses would constitute a much graver threat to Allied bombers than 
AWPD/1 expected. In his insightful study, entitled Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 
1914-1945, Edward Westerman sheds some much needed light on this misunderstood 
aspect of the air war over Europe and details how ground-to-air defenses “accounted for 
at least half of American aircraft combat losses during the war.”126 With a maximum 
ceiling of 33,000 feet for the 88-mm flak gun and a 48,559 feet maximum for the 128-
mm gun, the safety of high-altitude was greatly negated.
127
 USAAF losses in Europe 
from flak would total 5,400, with 2,076 of these from the 15
th
 Air Force which operated 




 Challenging the emphasis on fighter aircraft in the historical narrative Westerman 
takes a more holistic approach to the Germany defense system, seeing both active and 
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passive elements as interlocking and playing off each other‟s strengths to present a 
formidable opponent to the Allied air offensive. He poses a fundamental question, that of 
what constituted success in German defenses. “Would the measure of effectiveness lie in 
the number of aircraft brought down, or would it be found in the more indeterminate 
standard associated with success in protecting the bomber‟s intended target from 
damage?”129 The prevalence of the first view would explain the emphasis on active 
defenses within the historical dialogue. If held to this standard the anti-aircraft defense of 
German cannot be viewed as a success; U.S. production more than compensated for any 
loss of aircraft. If the second perspective is taken then one can argue that, due to 
industrial production increases in spite of bombardment, the German defensive network 
performed remarkably well under heavy strain. This question of perception and what 
constitutes success is also vital in understanding the actions and results of the USAAF at 
Ploesti. 
 The Germans developed a system based on the resource most abundantly 
available to them, and though the internal combustion engine necessitated oil stocks it did 
not result in the realigning of the German economy to petroleum. This was a fact lost on 
American planners and, combined with the sizable air defense network created in Europe, 
would be the cause of much grief in the campaign to come.  
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Chapter 4: Too Little Too Soon 
 If the German economy‟s absolute dependence upon oil is questionable, or rather 
if there existed target systems that were much more vital to its operation, how did the 
Allies come to see it as being a necessary industrial component? A misunderstanding was 
incorporated into policy because personal preference had as much to do with target 
selection as solid analysis. Mierzejewski discusses in detail the struggle over target 
priorities, with Gen. Spaatz‟s desire to target oil conflicting with Air Chief Marshall Sir 
Arthur Tedder‟s (RAF) focus on transportation.130 General Arnold himself considered 
Ploesti, and the oil refined there, to be “the most important target in the war.”131 The 
difference in opinion was fueled by an increasingly powerful and unrestrained 
intelligence apparatus composed of various agencies competing to ensure their target sets 
were adopted. “The decisive factor, then, in determining what targets were attacked by 
the Allied strategic air forces were the views of the decision makers, especially Harris, 
Spaatz, and Tedder, their advisors access to them, the credibility that the intelligence 
agencies enjoyed with them, and what was known about the German economy, especially 
its energy and transportation sectors.”132 These bureaucratic entities included ad hoc ones 
such as the Air War Planning Division and the Committee of Operations Analysts 
(COA), and more permanent ones such as the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, the 
Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of 
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The Allure of Ploesti 
 A fascination with the importance of oil had existed long before the outbreak of 
war and was pervasive throughout both the military and civilian leadership. Winston 
Churchill, in his first address as Prime Minister, lauded the air crews that were “striking 
nightly at the tap root of German mechanized power, and have already inflicted serious 
damage upon the oil refineries which the Nazi effort to dominate the world directly 
depends.”134 Due to its position as the number one supplier of crude oil on the European 
continent, Ploesti would naturally catch the eye of both politicians and planners. In 1939, 
production of crude petroleum from Romania totaled 6,240,000 tons, which was 2.18% 
of total world production. To put this into some perspective, the United States produced 
173,512,939 tons that same year which constituted 60.45% of world output.
135
 With these 
production numbers in mind it is easy to see the difference between the American 
economy and that of Axis-dominated Europe. The United States had the luxury of 
establishing oil-intensive industrial and military projects whereas Germany, with its 
largest source of crude on the continent being only 3.59% of U.S. output, was limited 
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from the start as to the shape of its „modern‟ state.136 It is also important to keep in mind 
that Romanian refining capacity in 1939 was approximately 11,000,000 tons.
137
 This 
would leave excess capacity in the amount of 4,760,000. This massive amount would first 
have to be destroyed for any attacks to have an effect upon Romanian production and 
therefore on the German war machine.  
 Germany was not the only nation that wanted access to Romanian crude. Before 
the Germanization of Romanian oil production in 1940 the British, Dutch, French, 
Belgians, Americans, and Italians all had a commercial interest in refinery operations. 
The major refineries in the Ploesti area consisted of Astra Romana (British-Dutch), 
Concordia Vega (French-Belgian), Romana-Americana (American), Unirea (British), 
Orion (British), Standard Petrol Block (Romanian-foreign stock holders), Columbia 
Aquila (French), Redeventa and Xenia (stock holders), Dacia, Steaua Romana (French-
British-Romanian located northwest of Ploesti at nearby Campina), and Creditul Minier 
(the only entirely Romanian owned refinery in the area south of Ploesti at Brazi).
138
 With 
Ion Antonescu‟s seizure of power on September 5, 1940, a much more German-friendly 
regime assisted in the ousting of foreign interests in Romania. As the following map 
illustrates there was a clear distinction between the refinery areas and the population 
centers, thus the campaigns against Ploesti provide a clear means to judge the 
effectiveness of USAAF precision bombing doctrine in practice. 
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The Defensive Situation at Ploesti 
 Even before the American entry into the war an idea of the extensive defenses at 
Ploesti was available to air planners. Mr. Paul W. Lambright, the General Manager of 
Standard Oil in Romania and a retired U.S. naval officer, submitted a series of reports in 
1941 detailing the situation on the ground at the refineries. One of the key points of his 
report is the necessity of accuracy to assure destruction of vital plant components. “Since 
such vital points as boiler installations and electric power plants are already in most 
instances, especially in the refineries, housed in brick buildings this is generally 
considered sufficient protection except against direct hits.”140 Due to blast walls erected 
around key points, Lambright determined that it would “require direct hits to effect much 
damage on the units, unless very powerful bombs are used.”141 As far as anti-aircraft 
defense are concerned, Lambright painted the picture of an area bristling with guns and 
with fighter support close by.
142
  
 This situation was discussed much more in depth by William Mattingly, Manager 
of Standard Oil in Romania and on location until October 1941. “The area is surrounded 
by anti-aircraft batteries principally of 108 mm. guns, although there are also smaller 50 
mm. rapid-fire combination anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns for use against low-flying 
planes. The air defense of Ploesti has been taken over exclusively by the German Army, 
both the material and the personnel thereof are German and all regulations for air-raid 
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protection are adopted and enforced by the German military authorities.”143 It was made 
perfectly apparent even before America entered the war that Ploesti would be a very 
demanding target and would have to be approached with both effective planning and 
sufficient force; the first American attack against it would demonstrate neither. 
  
Showing Their Hand 
 In the wake of Pearl Harbor American citizens and their leaders desired to strike 
back at their new enemies and the best and only means at their disposal was the long-
range bomber. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo was not the sole attack planned upon Japan. 
The Halverson Project, named after the mission‟s commander Colonel Halverson and 
nicknamed HALPRO, was originally slated for an attack on Japan but due to the loss of 
Chinese airbases the B-24s remained in Khartoum, Sudan. Their target was changed to 
Ploesti. There were some reservations about the mission, “but the Joint Chiefs overruled 
the misgivings of some airmen who said that Ploesti was too far for planes to carry an 
effective bomb load. They would have to trade bombs for extra gas to bring them 
back.”144  
 The attack was launched against Ploesti before midnight on June 11, 1942, 
making it the first attack by the USAAF against European targets in World War Two.
145
 
It was kept a secret and the mission would not make its way into the press until June 14, 
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and even then many vital details were not released.
146
 According to a post-mission 
summary dated June 29, 1942, thirteen B-24s were launched from Fayid, Egypt, hardly 
the massing of force called for by Mitchell. Formation flying was not used. Traveling just 
under 1300 miles one way the crews were met with a less than optimal bombing 
environment: 
 
An overcast at 10,000 feet compelled many crews to bomb below the 
clouds. Objectives were reported to be camouflaged. Heavy anti-aircraft 
fire was encountered, and some planes met fighter resistance. At the same 
time, technical difficulties, including ineffective bomb mechanisms and 
duds, were encountered. The American Military Attaché at Ankara has 
forwarded a report from French sources in Bucharest confirming that the 
bombing results at Ploesti were restricted to several casualties and a few 




 All that the HALPRO mission did, in effect, was inform the Nazis that the 
Americans possessed the range, capability, and desire to attack Ploesti. According to 
Dugan and Stewart, this fact was not lost on General Alfred Gerstenberg, the German 
officer in charge of defending the town. He would oversee the construction of an above-
ground piping system which connected the refineries to allow for quick repair and 
continued production while making Ploesti the third-largest concentration of flak in 
Europe.
148
 HALPRO did achieve one more thing in the mind of General Eisenhower, it 
“did something to dispel the illusion that a few big planes could win a war.”149 
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What Should Be Bombed? 
 After HALPRO the question regarding the bombing of Ploesti was not whether it 
should be attempted but rather what constituted the optimal target to deny the Nazis 
Romanian oil products.
150
 While acknowledging both the active and passive defenses 
around vital areas within the refineries Lambright still saw them as being the optimum 
target. An AAF Intelligence assessment of Ploesti pointed to the important role of the 
refineries themselves, stating that the “twelve large oil refineries in this objective area 
produce approximately 86% of the refined petroleum products of Rumania and represent 
96% of the total cracking capacity.”151 The same report went on to mention the 
importance of transportation in the region: 
 
The Rumanian petroleum production (crude or refined) is of assistance to 
the Axis only if the oil can be effectively transported from the Ploesti area. 
Although the pipelines move a considerable amount of oil from Ploesti to 
Giurgiu, yet (sic) 80% of the oil leaving this area moves by rail. 
Continuous and effective operations against refineries and transportation 






The importance of transportation to Ploesti was not lost on the OSS. In a report written 
December 30, 1942, while it is recognized that the loss of the oil-producing capabilities 
of the region would have a crippling effect on Axis supplies, the report reinforces the 
opinion of AC/AS. “Germany‟s greatest problem has been one of transportation. Should 
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the railroad between Ploesti and the crest of the Carpathians – a distance of about 50 
miles – be bombed it would completely upset Germany‟s transportation system.”153 
 The COA took a different view of the oil situation and broke the system down 
into crude and synthetic production at a committee meeting on December 23, 1942. In 
regards to crude, the situation was quickly determined to be near insurmountable due to 
the scope of the effort that would be required. “The refining capacity in Europe is far in 
excess of the necessary consumption. It is so far in excess that it would be necessary to 
destroy or neutralize 39 of the major refineries before you cut the refining capacity down 
to the present consumption.”154 During the course of the meeting the consensus 
developed that the sixteen Bergius hydrogenation plants within Germany were the 
optimal link in the oil chain due to their flexibility and role in the production of precious 
aviation fuel. The target was chosen not due to its strategic economic consequences but 
its purely tactical military effect. There was the question of the possible rerouting of raw 
materials to continue production, and the importance of transportation as a supporting 
target became apparent. “The destruction of the Bergius plants and hitting transportation 
to prevent Rumanian crude from being transported would have disastrous effects.”155  
 Any supposed attack on the transportation network of Ploesti was always assumed 
to coincide with attacks on its refineries. The real question is: why not just attack 
transportation out of Ploesti? The refineries could produce all the petroleum products in 
the world but if the finished product was unable to get to the engines that required fuel 
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then the oil was useless. The refineries were concentrated and therefore heavily defended, 
whereas it would be impossible to defend every mile of rail leaving the city. The map on 
page 61 shows one rail line leading northwest to Germany, one to the north, and one to 
the eastern front. As mentioned previously rail moved 80% of the oil from Ploesti. Add to 
this an extensive mining of the Danube and you have the means to produce the same 
effect as the destruction of the refineries without having to eat away at excess capacity or 
send men over an extremely heavily defended area. Why was this not attempted? Was it 
the need to sell pictures of bomb damage to the public regardless of results? Did the idea 
of strategic bombing burn so brightly in the minds of air planners that they were blinded 
to alternate considerations? 
 The Bombardment Advisory Committee of the COA actually tackled the question 
of making Ploesti‟s transportation the primary target. The report is not convincing. While 
transportation along the Danube was important, its position in Ploesti‟s transportation 
network was overestimated. “The blocking of the Danube appears to be a very doubtful 
project. If it cannot be accomplished, it appears impossible to insure denying German 
access to Rumanian oil.”156 A USSBS report after the war would claim that the limited 
attacks on the Danube were extremely effective, that they “slowed traffic decisively,” and 
that more extensive mining could have had a much more dramatic effect.
157
  “Fifty-two 
percent of the mine explosions resulted in total losses.”158  
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 Amazingly the Bombardment Advisory Committee disregarded transportation, 
resulting in the COA not advocating it as a strategy at Ploesti. “The conclusion seems 
inescapable that to deny Rumanian oil to the Axis war economy can be accomplished 
through transportation targets only at a great expense and that the results in any event 
would be uncertain.”159 As we shall see, one can look back at the entire USAAF 
campaign over Ploesti and easily replace “transportation targets” in the above phrase with 
“refinery targets” and it fits perfectly.  Recognizing the fact that refinery capacity was 
“nearly double” the output, the Committee still advocated for the targeting of the oil 
refineries themselves.
160
 Ultimately, transportation would give way to refineries as the 




ACTS Doctrine Discarded 
 There would be quite a time laps between the HALPRO mission and the 
USAAF‟s return to Ploesti. This well publicized and studied mission would be 
undertaken by the Ninth Air Force stationed in Libya under General Lewis Brereton and 
would run counter to many of the central tenants of the strategic bombing doctrine 
developed at ACTS.  This mission “had the unique distinction of killing more airmen 
(over 300) than persons on the ground (under 120) and the highest wastage (planes that 
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never flew again) rate of any major mission of the war.”162 Again the refineries 
themselves would be the targets, and the desire was to halt production at Ploesti through a 
single devastating attack. Even at ACTS it was understood, at least early on, that repeated 
missions would need to be flown to achieve total destruction of the target. According to 
General Brereton, the return to Ploesti was “agitated in London” as early as April 9, 
1943. Believing that current campaigns took precedence Brereton was “strongly 
opposed” to such a mission at that time.163 Colonel Jacob Smart, an advisor in General 
Arnold‟s staff, was given the job of planning the attack. He had “no combat experience” 




 Smart‟s solution was to attack the heavily-defended refineries at Ploesti at low-
level. He would later say that he got the idea by observing a Douglas A-20 Havoc 
demonstration.
165
 This was an aircraft designed for close-combat support, which was not 
the case with the B-24 bomber.
166
 “It was understood that four-engine heavies were 
totally unsuited for such a mission,”167 but the plan was approved by General 
Eisenhower, General Arnold, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Roosevelt and Churchill at 
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the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943. According to Smart the decision was once again 
a matter of numbers, as “it was quite apparent that we could not destroy the targets by 
high-level attack. We could never muster and bring to bear the required force in sufficient 
time to destroy the productive capacity effectively.”168 This is an extraordinarily telling 
statement. It shows that there were those within Arnold‟s inner circle that had not bought 
into the doctrine as developed at ACTS; many doubts remained about high-altitude 
bombing and its ability to effectively destroy a target.
169
 Eisenhower would later discuss 
his severe misgivings about the plan: 
 
One feature to which we objected was the confidence placed in the 
efficacy of a single attack. Too often we had found that factories listed by 
our experts as destroyed were again working at full output within a matter 
of weeks or even days. We raised another question as to the advisability of 
the undertaking. The target selected was a great refinery, but our 
information led us to believe that the enemy had a surplus of refining 
capacity and that his true oil shortage was in production and distribution 




 What of Ploesti‟s defensive situation? Much unwarranted emphasis was put on 
the element of surprise that was thought could be achieved by a low-level attack. It was 
believed that “the defenses, primed for high-altitude attack, would be confused and 
inefficient. There would be little danger from heavy flak and the surprise from a low-
level attack might render ineffective a large proportion of enemy ground and air defenses 
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such as light flak, fighters, balloons, and smoke-pots.”171A study of RAF wartime 
experience would have provided a much needed insight for both Smart and Brereton.
172
 
For example, during a mission against German shipping at Schillig Roads on December 
14, 1939, British aircrews experienced the low-level accuracy of anti-aircraft fire. “Poor 
weather forced the aircraft down at times to as low as 200 feet. The formation then came 
under coordinated attack from anti-aircraft fire and German fighters and lost five aircraft. 
The RAF ascribed these losses to anti-aircraft, not to German fighters, and ordered 
bombers subsequently to attack their targets from altitudes above 10,000 feet.”173 By 
believing that the defenses would be negated by a low-level attack the Ploesti planners 
were carrying on a long tradition of assumption in aerial warfare. “Intelligence firmly 
estimated that the flak and detection systems were arraigned in Ploesti‟s eastern 
approaches, toward the Soviets, and denied the possibility of effective defenses in the 
northern, western, and southern salients of Ploesti.”174Air crews were also told that 
barrage balloon cables would not be a problem; the wings of the B-24 would break them. 
According to 376
th
 Bombardment Group Captain Jack Preble, “At the briefing they were 
told that if they ignored the balloons and knifed right through the cables they would stand 
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a good chance of coming through with little damage to their bombers. This Pollyanna 
information was greeted with quiet skepticism.”175 
 The pre-mission assurances of the ineffectiveness of Ploesti‟s defenses did not 
convince many of the men that would be flying the mission. In fact, General Uzal Ent, 
Brereton‟s Chief of Staff, wrote a very detailed report comparing and contrasting the 
high-altitude and low-level attacks based solely on his “personal opinions”. He pointed to 
the increased morale inherent in a high-level attack and the fact that the crews had 
already been trained in this method; a low level mission would require intensive 
retraining. He also pointed to the difficulty of target selection during a low level attack, 
the possibility that smoke “could easily cause an abortive mission”, and estimated losses 
at “75 A/C or 71% greater than for high level.”176 However, the risk to the crews was 
overshadowed by the pressure from on high to strike a single decisive blow against 
Ploesti. Ultimately the type of attack to be used was decided upon by Brereton and he 
took full responsibility.
177
 “After receiving the target folders I studied them for two 
weeks before making up my mind on the low-level attack. I invited no discussion 
whatsoever among the commanders.”178 
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 On the early morning of August 1, 1943, 178 B-24s
179
 took off from Benghazi 
Libya carrying “500-lb and 1,000-lb demolition bombs totaling 311 tons.”180 The mission 
did not unfold as planned. As several detailed narratives of the attack exist there is no 
need for an in-depth description here, but there are several aspects that are important to 
this study.
181
As the aircraft crossed Albania they were separated into two distinct groups 
due to cloud cover. Radio silence was to be maintained throughout the mission to assist in 
achieving surprise. This lack of communication would not only be felt in the clouds over 
Albania but also when the lead group mistook the town of Targovisti for its initial point 





Groups on course to bomb Bucharest. Radio silence was finally broken to correct the 
mistake. Not only had the force become separated but now two groups would be 
approaching from the south/southeast instead of the northwest as briefed. The result over 
Ploesti was bombers flying every which way through intense flak that was fully capable 
of hitting them.  
 What is fascinating about the strict order to maintain radio silence which 
contributed to the separation and wrong turn is that no element of surprise was ever 
achieved by the Americans on August 1, 1943. The utmost secrecy was attempted during 
the planning stages of the mission; the crew members were not officially informed of 
their target until the night before. Regardless of the strict control of information, 
                                                 
179








 and the 
398
th
, the last three being on loan from the Eighth Air Force in England. 
180
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everyone in the area could tell that something major was underway. The addition of 120 
aircraft from England did not go unnoticed by the local population nor did the intense 
low-level training in the desert. According to Dugan and Stewart, due to spies in Libya 
and the deciphering of the Allied code, “the Germans knew immediately that the force 
was up from Benghazi.”182 Was it even possible to conceal a mass of 178 four-engine 
bombers? “Between German radio and radar contact, sightings over Bulgaria, and the 
spectacle created by the heavy bomber formation motoring over the Danube at extremely 
low altitude, the defenders of Ploesti knew that an attack was coming.”183 It is 
incomprehensible that a plan could be executed that relied solely on surprise, which was 
not at all achievable, as the primary means to protect the lives of American crewmen.
184
 
 How did the pre-mission assumptions hold in action? The defenses exacted a 
heavy toil upon the American crews who were sent on a mission that called for the exact 
opposite of their aircraft‟s purpose and official training. “Indications are that 90 per cent 
of the damage was caused by antiaircraft fire. 20-mm and 37-mm or 40-mm were used 
with telling effect. 88-mm guns were fired point-blank with shells bursting within 
relatively short distance of the muzzle.”185 In addition to the stationary defenses, the 
Germans surprised the attackers with a flak train, the results of which were disastrous due 
to the pilots having been instructed to follow the rail line on their approach.
186
 On the 
return trip the survivors were set upon by German fighters resulting in even more losses. 
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183
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184
 Reconnaissance flights were not even allowed to determine the exact strength of the defenses before the 
attack due to the fear that surprise would be lost.   
185
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Area.” September 30, 1943. (142.034-2, in the USAF collection, AFHRA), 30. 
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Several made their way for neutral Turkey, unable to complete the return trip to Libya. 
“The price was 53 Liberators, including eight interned in Turkey. The official report said 
that 446 airmen were killed or missing, 79 were interned in Turkey, and 54 were 
wounded.”187 
  
The 8/1/1943 Balance Sheet 
 Did the raid achieve a significant return for this investment in blood and material? 
The answer is no. Though “airplane for airplane, the attackers on this particular raid 
caused more damage than any other subsequent raid against Ploesti,”188 due to the huge 
cushion between refining capacity and production the damage did not achieve the desired 
results.  In fact, “within a few weeks Ploesti was producing at a greater rate than ever 
before.”189 An OSS study of the raid concluded that its “major result…is the elimination 
of approximately 3.9 million tons of excess refining capacity. The capacity destroyed 
represents almost all efficiently located spare refinery capacity in Axis Europe. 
Immediate loss of supplies by reason of the Ploesti raid is thought to be 
inconsiderable.”190 According to this evaluation, though the 8/1/1943 attack did not in 
and of itself reduce the production of Axis petroleum, if followed up with a full-scale 
attack upon the oil system the results could have been felt immediately and may have had 
a dramatic effect on Germany‟s ability to wage mechanized warfare. Yet none were 
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made. The Ninth was in no position to continue bombardment operations after the 
mauling it received on the first of August. Additional attacks against Ploesti had been 
planned but were scrapped soon after the cost of the mission became clear. According to 
Brereton, “ACM (Air Chief Marshall) Tedder advised me that he had recommended that 
further attacks on Ploesti be postponed in favor of direct support to the coming missions 
in Italy.”191 Pressure was not maintained and the limited accomplishments of the August 
raid were nullified. 
 The OSS was not alone in their dim analysis of the 1943 raid. Lt. Col. Forster, in 
the first interpretive report of the mission photographs, looked to the bombs used as the 
reason for the lack of serious and long-lasting damage. “The evidence indicates that the 
aircraft bombed the targets accurately but many of the bombs do not appear to have 
exploded, for this reason the damage is not as great as might have been expected.”192 
Problems with the bombs themselves would become a serious issue and, according to a 
USSBS postwar analysis, reached epidemic proportions. “One in every six bombers sent 
on these attacks might just as effectively loaded its bomb bays with scrap iron. Missions 
were wasted and lives of airmen lost flying junk to Germany.”193 Forster also addressed 
the issue of bomb weight. “As a general indication it is suggested that neither 500-lb nor 
1,000-lb (bombs) falling outside the protective blast walls are certain to cause vital 
damage, although they may cause very serious secondary damage.”194 It is almost as if 
Lambright never wrote his report. Since pinpoint accuracy was not possible, even at low-
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level, larger bombs would have to be used. It is amazing that throughout the subsequent 
1944 attacks against Ploesti no bombs larger than 1,000 pounds were ever used by the 
USAAF. Regardless of these points Forster still asserts that the mission was a success “in 
view of the great distance covered and the difficulties encountered.”195 As with German 
flak defenses the definition of success was vital and in this case it became flexible based 
on results; the definition changed in the minds of many to the mere fact that the mission 
had taken place at all. In the end it is results that are important and the 1943 low-level 
raid did not achieve its desired effect, hence it cannot be considered successful. “It is 
therefore concluded that there will be no ultimate loss of products except such stocks as 
were actually destroyed during the raid.”196  
 What did the Germans think of this daring low-level raid? Did they feel it was 
successful? According to a Luftwaffe report, “a repetition of this type of attack should by 
no means be expected, as the B-24 proved insufficient in a flak protected area and the 
light flak proved to be considerably more effective than was expected.”197 The Germans 
clearly recognized the toll their defenses had taken on the presumptuous attackers, and 
the inability to repeat the attack was taken as a defensive victory.   
 The British proposed an attack on Ploesti to maintain pressure on oil production. 
In a telegram dated November 1, 1943, they brought up the possibility of contributing to 
the attacks on Ploesti in their own unique way: 
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As you may not be able to make further heavy day attack on Ploesti in 
immediate future consider that an attack by Wellingtons on Ploesti town 
might have beneficial effect. Refinery workers who live in badly built and 
flimsy houses in that town would thus be exposed to temperatures of the 
order of minus twenty degrees centigrade with obvious results on their 
work. A few blockbusters might therefore achieve a very substantial effect 





Though this offer was not accepted by the USAAF, it is comforting to know that the 
British were willing to “do their part” during this phase of the Ploesti campaign.  
  With the amount of excess capacity and an obvious inability to achieve the much 
necessary element of surprise, why was such an attack launched? There is the very real 
issue of momentum to consider. Just shy of 80,000 aircraft were produced and 
approximately 2,400,000 personnel trained for the Army Air Force to achieve its 
objectives during the course of World War Two.
199
 Such a force required that some 
action be taken to justify its creation, political leaders and the public expected as much. 
This concept was perfectly expressed by General Anderson after the war when he was 




There wasn‟t any. No Sir. It was all: we‟ve got a program, we‟ve got to 
run it; we‟ve got a force, we‟ve got to use it. The same reason why we did 
our airborne operation in Orne: we‟ve got some airborne forces, goddam 
it; we‟ve got to use them, to justify the building of them.200 
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General Anderson also disapproved of any mission against Ploesti taking place after the 
summer of 1942, claiming that once the German advance into Russia had been halted 
Ploesti lost much of its strategic importance.
201
 This need to use the tools that have been 
developed, regardless of whether or not they fit the role demanded of them, would not be 
limited to World War II; it continued throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
and into the present. B-52s over Vietnam are a prime example, as are unarmored 
Humvees patrolling the streets of Baghdad. 
 Though the 1943 raid on Ploesti did not achieve its stated goals, it was incredibly 
useful as a propaganda tool. The USAAF skillfully diverted attention from the strategic 
and tactical failures of this venture and instead focused the public light on the courage 
and valor of American air crews. Like Custer‟s Last Stand and the British retreat at 
Dunkirk, manipulation of public perception turned a grim situation into one of benefit. 
202
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 Unlike the HALPRO mission, the raid made the next day‟s headline in the New 
York Times and was praised as an action that “may materially affect the course of the 
war.”203 Though claiming that Ploesti produced “90 per cent of the German Air Force‟s 
gasoline”, which was demonstrably false, the New York Times correctly stated the 
number of aircraft involved and the fact that they were all B-24s. The paper took a much 
more analytical tone on August 3
rd
, recognizing that the complete destruction of Ploesti 




 As we have seen, the first two visits to Ploesti by the USAAF were fundamentally 
different from the doctrine developed at ACTS. Almost a year had passed between the 
two, negating the concept of repeated attacks to maintain pressure upon the target. The 
HALPRO raid was flown at mid-altitude with an incredibly small force that attacked 
targets randomly. The famous raid of 1943 was extraordinarily micromanaged, but the 
realities of warfare and the element of chance negated this preponderance of planning. 
The disregarding of one doctrinal pillar (high-altitude bombardment) resulted in the 
adoption of a false assumption, that low-altitude would provide surprise. While the 1944 
operations against Ploesti would more closely resemble the doctrine taught at the Air 
Corp Tactical School, air planners were not yet finished experimenting with ways to 
address both the inability of their equipment to live up to their expectations and the 
impressive defenses amassed around this Romanian town. 
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Chapter 5: Trying to Force Doctrine into Reality 
 
 Though the planned follow-up missions after August 1, 1943 did not occur, the 
obsession with Ploesti remained with USAAF leaders. Spaatz was still focused on the 
destruction of Germany‟s oil supply 
and America‟s return to Ploesti was 
not a question of if but of when.
205
 
With the capture of Southern Italy 
the Allies occupied a base of 
operations that allowed for 
penetrations into Southern Germany, 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The 
area around Foggia, Italy was turned 
into a giant air base and became the 
operational center of the Fifteenth 
Air Force which had been activated 
206
 on November 11, 1943 under 
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General Doolittle. When Doolittle was transferred to the Eighth Air Force, General 
Nathan F. Twining was put in command of the Fifteenth. By June 15, 1944 the Fifteenth 








 and the 304
th
, 
divided into 21 bomb groups. This massive bombing force was protected by the 306
th
 




 The question once again became how to effectively use this force. Spaatz and 
other oil enthusiasts did not find a champion within the Committee of Operations 
Analysts. In a report reexamining the crude oil situation, the COA determined that, “in its 
judgment, although the events of the past year have increased the target importance of 
crude oil refineries, they should not be given a higher target priority.”208 This 
recommendation was due to the belief that it would require six months for the Germans 
to use their currents stocks, only then would the attacks have an effect upon enemy 
actions in the field. Even then, the paralyzing effect of an increased attack on oil was by 
no means certain in the eyes of the members of the COA. It was estimated that 
production could only be cut by 2,750,000 tons through an oil offensive, and that “a 
reduction of this order would mean curtailment and not collapse.”209 Oil‟s importance as 
a target whose destruction would end the war was by no means certain nor agreed upon, 
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but it continued to be a quixotic vision to those that wished to bring into reality the 
doctrine developed during the interwar years. The struggle over bombing priorities 
among Allied leaders continued throughout the spring of 1944. With the planned invasion 
of Europe on the table Eisenhower tended to side with Tedder over the immediate use of 




Blurring the Lines 
 A mission-by-mission breakdown of the 21 attacks that made up the 1944 
campaign against Ploesti (18 by the USAAF, 3 by the RAF) is neither necessary nor 
desired for our purposes, but there are some aspects of these missions that require further 
discussion.
211
 On April 5, 1944, as part of the new campaign against transportation, the 
Fifteenth Air Force sent a force to Ploesti to attack the large marshalling yards south of 
the city. There appears to be some subterfuge on behalf of the USAAF to circumvent the 
British-backed transportation priority and the nearby refineries were intentionally hit 
along with the rail yards.
 212
 An addendum to the 376
th
 Bomb Group‟s strike report for 
this date also makes mention that “several clusters (of bombs were) far over and to left in 
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city area.”213 The 301st Bomb Group report discusses a similar instance, with the city area 
taking hits due to the bombs falling short and to the left of the target.
214
 What is important 
about these occurrences is that, though there was fierce fighter and flak cover, there was 
no report of a smoke screen in operation during this raid. What would the toll be upon the 
city as the smoke screen became a vital component in the defense of the refineries? 444.5 
tons worth of 500 lb general purpose bombs and 144.2 tons of incendiaries were dropped 
by 95 B-17s and 136 B-24s on this first raid by the Fifteenth Air Force.
215
 The USAAF 
would rarely use incendiaries at Ploesti and the general purpose bomb, in the 500 lb and 
1,000 lb varieties, became the standard package. Air planners had learned at least one 
lesson from August 1943 and no heavy bomber attack against Ploesti during 1944 would 
be below 19,000 feet.  
 The two return trips in April, on the 15
th
 and the 24
th
, would continue to officially 
target the marshalling yards, but the bombing „accidently‟ struck oil targets as well. In 
this case the inability to achieve true precision appears to have benefited Spaatz and like-
minded USAAF leaders. The Intelligence Operations (INTOPS) report for April 24
th
 
brings to the surface some interesting questions. It states that there were three primary 
targets that day, the south, east, and north marshalling yards. Due to „smoke‟ over the 




 Bomb Groups 
assigned to the east and the 39 from the 376
th
 that were to attack the north all assisted the 
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204 aircraft attacking the south marshalling yard. Due to the inherent nature of strategic 
bombardment at the time the bomb strings „accidentally‟ entered the Astra Romana 
refinery.
216
 After reading this report one cannot help but get the impression that this 
mission was in reality an attack upon Astra Romana. As the following table illustrates, 
these „transportation‟ attacks in April somehow succeeded in cutting into oil production, 
but the damage was by no means permanent. 
 
           
217
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 On May 5
th
 the Fifteenth launched a total of 523 aircraft to officially attack the 
Ploesti marshalling yards and pumping station, 93% of which (486) would drop their 
bombs (somewhat) over the target.
218
 This was Leroy Newby‟s first mission to Ploesti 
with the 460
th
 Bomb Group as the bombardier aboard the Hanger Queen. He claims their 
target was not the marshalling yards as listed in the INTOPS Report but rather Xenia 
refinery, where they were to attack the “tank farms and nearby distillation unit.”219 The 
flak was listed as “very intense, accurate, heavy.”220 This would become a familiar phrase 
in the INTOPS reports to come. Not much had changed since the time of AWPD/1 as far 
as the bomber crew‟s defense against flak was concerned. “Our instructions were very 
clear. Fly into and through the box of flak.”221 The defenses of Ploesti were so great and 
the suggested responses to them so blatantly ridiculous that seven aircraft were lost to 
flak and 132 of the 486 aircraft over the target were hit by it, a whopping 21 percent of 
the total.
222
 Once again, 500 lb bombs were used. All following missions list refineries as 
primary targets due to a compromise between the transportation and oil factions. In fact, 
on June 8, 1944 Spaatz was secure enough in his position to issue an order to all air 
forces in theater “that their primary strategic aim henceforth would be to deny oil to the 
enemy‟s armed forces.”223  
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 This order may have marked the official change, but there is telling evidence that 
an active concealment took place up to this point in the skies over Ploesti. According to 
the May 5
th
 INTOPS report, the 304
th
 Bomb Wing was to attack the north marshalling 
yards. As the following photograph indicates, they dropped their load to the south of the 
marshalling yards, in the northeastern section of the town.  
224
 
While this in itself is cause for concern, what is even more so is the fact that the 
Concordia Vega refinery is used as the aiming point to judge the accuracy of the mission. 
                                                 
224
 Bomb Plot Photo, 301
st
 Bomb Wing. May 1944 (670.3652, in the USAF collection, AFHRA) Note the 
clear distinction between the refineries and the population center. 
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If the crews were to be held to this aiming point as the standard that would determine 
whether their mission was successful then they had to have been told so. If this is the case 
then the INTOPS report writer was either grossly misinformed or there was something 
very wrong. 
 There is also a discrepancy between the MASAF (Mediterranean Allied Strategic 





Bomb Groups. According to the theater-level report, the two groups, both elements of the 
47
th
 Bomb Wing, had the Romana Americana refinery as their primary target.
225
 Both of 
the group-level reports list the city itself as their target, with the 449
th
 even listing its 
aiming point as the “center of city.”226 Whether this was the briefed target or the point 
where the bombs were released due to smoke cover and enemy opposition is unclear. 
Newby discusses at length the effect of smoke cover on this particular mission.
227
 “I 
couldn‟t see the target, let alone the aiming point. It was a helpless feeling to relocate my 
hairs on a nebulous section of white nothing, hoping my target would somehow be at that 
spot.”228 Someone must have hit something because as shown by the MASAF 
Intelligence Section‟s statistical data on page 85, the May 31 raid had a profound impact 
upon production at Ploesti. 
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The Struggle against the Defenses 
 June was the month of the smoke screen. The effectiveness of this passive defense 
once again depends on ones definition of success, but if frustrating the efforts of the 
American bomb crews is to be the standard then it was highly successful. Trying to bomb 
visually on June 6 must have been a nightmare, flying through flak to drop bombs into a 
sea of fluff. It is hard to justify putting one‟s life on the line if you are unable to evaluate 
the outcome. The day‟s INTOPS Summary results section is riddled with variations of the 
phrase “heavily obscured by smoke pots making bomb strike assessment impossible.”229  
 Col. Barr, deputy Air Chief of Staff, A-2, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, 
recommended two ways to overcome the highly effective smoke screen at Ploesti. The 
first was to utilize dive bombing, and the second was the use of P.F.F. (PathFinder Force, 
or radar-assisted „H2X‟ bombing).230 On June 10 seventy-five Lockheed P-38 
„Lightnings‟ were launched against Ploesti, thirty-six carrying a single 1,000 lb bomb to 
be used in a dive-bombing attack on Romana Americana with the rest providing fighter 
escort. Even more so than the attack of August 1, 1943, this went completely contrary to 
accepted doctrine and is in effect an admission that it was not working against such a 
heavily defended target as Ploesti. A total of twenty-three P-38s were lost, almost 31% of 
the force.
231
 The next attack on June 24 against Romana Americana by B-24s would 
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again be thwarted by a highly effective smoke screen resulting in an almost wasted 
mission. “Post raid recon shows heavy concentrations of strike on all sides of the 
refinery, but only a few scattered hits inside the plant causing only negligible damage.”232  
  High-altitude heavy bomber attacks continued throughout July and August as the 
Fifteenth struggled to overcome the defenses of Ploesti.  The attack of July 9
th
 utilized 
every means available at the time in an attempt to put the bombs on target. Against Xenia 
the 2
nd
 and the 463
rd







had to resort to PFF assistance “due to the smoke screen over the target.”233 It is 
interesting to note that in a raid lasting nine minutes that 40% of the attacking force could 
see the target and utilize the more effective method of visual bombing. The attack on 








 Bomb Groups was executed utilizing a 
mixture of visual bombing, offset, PFF and synchronous methods.
234
 The results were 
unknown due to the mission photos being concealed by smoke. Almost the entire attack 
of July 15 was executed with PFF methods.
235
 Though radar-assistance had been used 
against Ploesti to some extent since the beginning of the Fifteenth‟s operations, its use 
would increase throughout the summer of 1944. As illustrated by the table on page 85 the 
effectiveness of the bombing missions decreased substantially over those that relied more 
upon visual methods during the spring. “The accuracy obtained with H2X through 10/10 
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clouds is .02 per cent of the bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point as compared 
with 30 per cent dropped under visual conditions.”236 How could precision targets, 
protected from all but direct hits, be effectively attacked under these circumstances? 
 Such methods inevitably resulted in bombs hitting places other than their desired 
industrial targets. Dugan and Stewart discuss the negative view that the Romanian people 
had for the “Italians”, those bombing from Italy in 1944, due to the inaccuracy of their 
methods and the casualties that resulted.
237
 To counter this public perception the Allies 
launched a parallel „bombing‟ mission which showered the Romanians with leaflets 
referred to as nickels. These placed the blame for the destruction squarely on the German 
smoke screen and called on the Romanians to do everything within their power to destroy 
and sabotage the generators.
 238
  This assumes that if it were not for this passive defense 
system only industrial and military targets would be on the receiving end of the bombs.  
 The amazing thing about the smoke screen is that there were ways to counteract it 
but the American propensity to cling to regimented, predictable order greatly assisted the 
defenders. The post-campaign interrogation of Colonel Rudieanu, a Romanian officer 
who assisted in overseeing flak defenses at Ploesti, by Lt. R.H. Dorr bears this out. The 
smoke was of limited duration, having only about a three hour window of effectiveness. 
“If American planes had attacked in waves over a period of 5 hours, it would, according 
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to Colonel Rudieanu, have been impossible to replace the used smoke barrels fast enough 
to maintain the screen; and the last groups would have been able to see the target.”239  
 Not only was the smoke screen a defensive measure that could have been 
overcome by adjusting procedure, but the effectiveness of flak defenses could have been 
reduced as well. Appendix Two contains a diagram of the flak defenses over Ploesti and 
provides an idea of the interlocking hail of shrapnel that would greet the approaching 
bombers. Attacks from the northeast, southeast, and southwest were under continuous fire 
for around three minutes, while attacks made from the northwest were “held under fire 
for over four minutes.”240 With 256 anti-aircraft guns of 88-mm size or larger beginning 
their defensive fire at 12,000 yards out Ploesti was a formidable and dangerous target.
 241
 
Multiple approaches during a small time period at various altitudes could have divided 
the defenses, diluting their effectiveness. 
  Returning over and over again to such a heavily defended area took its toll on the 
bomb crews. When writing about the August 17
th
 raid, Captain Jack Preble of the 376
th
 
Bomb Group described the mission as “another tiresome and dangerous Ploesti raid.”242 
Again, one cannot help but think of the plight of Yossarian in Joseph Heller‟s novel. 
Newby makes mention of the insanity of it all when he discusses the route to Belgrade. 
They were told to fly on a straight path to the target, even though that took them over 
four flak guns at Mostar which never failed to shoot at them. When this fact was brought 
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to the attention of their commanders they were told they had to continue taking this route 
to conserve fuel.
243
 Aviation fuel was apparently more important than lives to the United 
States though it possessed the resource in abundance. 
  
And the Credit Goes to… 
 The three days of August 17, 18, and 19 would be the last that the Fifteenth would 
see of Ploesti. 1,320.5 tons of 500 lb. bombs were dropped over these three days through 
a still highly effective smoke screen by a mixture of visual, offset and synchronous 
PFF.
244
 The historical literature either alludes to or simply comes out and claims that it 
was the bombing by the Allies that shut down production at Ploesti, but is this truly the 
case?
245
 If we refer back to the table on page 85 we see a cycle of bombing and repair, 
and in fact this cycle begins anew after the raid of August 19
th
. There was something else 
vastly more important taking place in August 1944 than just another series of USAAF 
raids. This was the advancing Red Army, which entered Ploesti on August 30
th
. Would it 
make any sense for the Germans to repair the refineries only to leave a functioning 
Ploesti for the Soviets? While the three day attack dropped a massive amount of tonnage 
upon Ploesti there was nothing different in the methods or bombs used from previous 
missions during the summer. It seems rather too coincidental and convenient that the 
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Allies would get it right just before the Russian capture of the city, though this is the 
picture painted in the popular narrative. 
  
Evaluating the Campaign 
 The entire American campaign against the oil refineries of Ploesti Romania came 
at a rather high price. “At the end Gerstenberg‟s bill was 286 U.S. heavy bombers and 
2,829 men killed or captured.”246 Was it worth the cost? Though Ploesti was not available 
for study by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey several of its reports are of 
value in answering this question and, more importantly, an OSS mission was allowed into 
Ploesti to conduct its own analysis immediately after its surrender to the Soviets.
247
 It is 
from these sources that we can piece together an understanding of the Ploesti operation 
and use that conclusion to determine the overall effectiveness of prewar doctrine. 
 Captain W.A. Salant, a member of the R&A Intelligence group sent to Ploesti, 
wrote a rather interesting report. According to the information he found on site, the 1943 
raid was the most successful when comparing bomb tonnage dropped to capacity denied 
the enemy. His overall conclusion of the 1944 campaign is striking due to the inclusion of 
a counterfactual to bolster the effort: 
Although a heavy weight of attack was directed against Ploesti between 
April and August, refinery activity in July and August was just as high as 
it had been in April, May and June. This does not mean that, if Rumania 
had continued in the war, the same weight of attack would have been 
required to hold action down to the 40% level. The August attacks left 
Ploesti in a highly vulnerable position. All but one of the larger refineries 
were incapable of any substantial production for some weeks or months. 
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The single exception, Astra Romana, accounted for considerably more 
than half of the potential production of the next month. One successful 
attack on it and Standard, comparable with the successful August raids on 
other installations, would have knocked production down to 15% of the 




 Repair estimates based on photographic analysis left much to be desired.
249
 
Questionable conclusions in turn dictated the type, frequency, and targets of the missions 
flown.  Repairs were made quickly due to the many refinery installations in such a close 
area which allowed for the moving around of parts to maintain production. In an 
interview with the Romanian Secretary General in charge of fuel, a Mr. Andonie, it was 
discovered that after a mere five days of continuous repairs in September 1944 
production was expected to reach 2070 ton per day, 7420 after ten days, and 8570 tons 
after twenty days.
250
 The USSBS Physical Damage Report would second this 
discrepancy, pointing out that building damage did not always equal a reduction in 
production.
251
 Lieutenants Clark and Rutenberg, themselves photographic interpreters, 
were dispatched to Romania and toured seven refineries between September 23 and 
October 4. The recommendations based on their observations are very telling. They state 
that photo interpreters in the future should be provided the weight and fusing of bombs 
used as well as have a “good knowledge of bombs (size and fusing used for particular 
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installations; what a bomb of a given weight and fusing is expected to do; blast and shock 
effects; ect.).”252 One would expect that these would have already been a vital part of 
photo interpretation training, and the fact that their inclusion was being recommended in 
October 1944 is surprising. 
 As we have already seen there was much discussion pertaining to the use of large 
bombs to effectively damage the protected vital parts of the refineries, and after the fall of 
Ploesti we have more of the same. “Inspection of damage at Astra Romana suggests that 
bomb sizes and fusings have not been optimum.”253 Larger bombs were vital to achieve 
the desired results and yet no change in bomb type occurred throughout the entirety of the 
USAAF Ploesti campaign. Only during R.A.F. night raids were the recommended sizes 
used. Who was responsible for making these recommendations reality?  
 One reason for a lack of change in bomb size could be the American reliance on 
probability. If an aircraft can only hold one 4,000 lb bomb or eight 500 lb bombs, and 
you are basing your entire strategy on the chance that at least one bomb must hit 
something, than the 500 lb load is more conducive to achieving such a hit. Whether or not 
that hit actually results in enough damage to effect production is secondary. This belief 
finds its roots with interwar planners, who argued that any direct hit from a 500 lb or 
1,000 lb bomb would destroy a target. Photo interpretation helped to reinforce this notion. 
Only after physical examination of the refineries could the truth be known. “An 
optimistic estimate is that 5 percent of the bombs which were dispatched to industrial 
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targets caused either structural or superficial damage.”254 This could easily have been 
discovered if practice raids against refinery installations under something even remotely 
resembling wartime conditions had taken place within the United States at some period 
before actual operations. Bomb size and fusing explains the inability of hits and near-
misses to produce the desired destruction, but this only helps to understand those few that 
actually made it close to their intended target. What of all those that did not? 
 Getting bombs to hit their targets 
was crucial and, as was discussed in 
chapter one, air planners between the 
wars believed they had solved this 
problem by dropping as many bombs as 
possible at the target hoping that one 
would result in its destruction. This led to 
the belief that the more bombers the 
better. The reality of wartime experience 
would tell a different story. “Two of the 
most important factors affecting accuracy 
255
 are altitude of attack and size of the 
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attacking force.”256 Altitude was necessary during daylight due to ground defenses, a 
large attacking force was required to achieve the required probability of hits, and massive 
formations were necessary for protection against German fighters. Unfortunately these 
formations had a negative effect on accuracy at the target. 
 The Bomb Groups attacking Ploesti not only had to deal with the difficulties of 
accuracy inherent in the system, but also those brought about by their target. “Of the 10 
target complexes analyzed, the two which proved most difficult to bomb accurately were 
synthetic oil and oil refineries.”257 While studying synthetic plants in Western Europe, the 
USSBS Oil Division found that only 12.9% of the bombs dropped fell within the fences 
of the plants, and only 3% of the total dropped hit any structures or equipment at all.
258
 
Visual bombing was more or less useless over Ploesti due to the smoke screen and 
reliance on PFF and offset did not increase accuracy. “During six attacks, 37 groups 
which used these methods dropped 11,988 bombs on their briefed targets whereas 
refinery records reveal only 40 bombs landed within the target areas. This is an accuracy 
of 3.66%.”259  Since they had to return until the job was done to the satisfaction of their 
superiors, it is easy to see why the men flying these missions dreaded hearing that this 
Romanian town was their target that day.  
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Conclusion: A Matter of Perception? 
 There is much to be learned from the study of the Ploesti raids. The first and most 
important is that real-world situations will require flexibility and this is most easily 
acquired if some level of adaptability is built into the plan before operations begin. The 
concept developed must be fluid enough to be effective once it is outside of the 
laboratory that created it.
 260
  Though the practical application of any theory does have an 
element of chance that influences the outcome, there is much that can be done to limit the 
effects of the unknown. At Ploesti the USAAF grabbed on to a few novel ideas but did 
not properly and thoroughly evaluate its operating procedure. Though technology may 
develop rapidly, fresh ways of thinking take longer to materialize. 
 New targeting technologies were adopted due to the effectiveness of the German 
defenses, but the bureaucratic nature of the USAAF contributed to its difficulties over 
Ploesti.  The flak defenses were static; it was beholden to the attackers to find ways to 
minimize their effectiveness. The main advantage of an aircraft is its freedom of 
movement. The inability of American planners to properly utilize this characteristic is a 
glaring fault that would continue in future operations, most notably in Vietnam. The 
following, listing the standard operating procedures which assisted the enemy based on 
interviews with the defenders, shows a lack of inventiveness that can also be found in 
conflicts throughout the latter half of the twentieth century: 
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1. Altitudes of attack were from 6000 to 8000 metres. 
2. Attacks so close to schedule defenders never worried before 10 o‟clock 
in the morning or after 3 o‟clock in the afternoon. 
3. After passing the I.P. a long straight bomb run to targets were made 
with no feints, evasive action or deviation. 
4. After first attacks in April it became evident that one of about five well 
defended ground areas were being used for the I.P. 
5. A standardized approach and departure system which, after two or three 
raids, was completely predicable because it was unvaried. 
6. Speed was within a few miles-per-hours of the average of first four 
attacks. 
7. Attacks were made when weather conditions and clouds were favorable 




It is rather amazing that such creativity could be harnessed to facilitate doctrinal 
development before the war yet once operations commenced bureaucratic rigidity and 
predictability took its place.  
 Regardless of the effectiveness of the bombs used and the accuracy of the 
bombing, reductions in crude oil production at Ploesti were made. The ultimate question 
then must address whether the bombing campaign was a success. When held to the 
standard championed by those at ACTS and the developers of AWPD/1 the answer must 
be no. It was believed that high-altitude bombing could destroy the enemy‟s ability to 
wage war and thus force them to sue for peace. This did not happen as a result of the 
bombing campaign against Ploesti, against oil, or even in the overall Combined Bomber 
Offensive. The oil campaign is seen by historians as the greatest strategic contribution 
made by the USAAF in World War Two. As we have seen, the fundamentals of the 
German economy were based upon coal and not oil. Therefore the major contribution of 
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the oil campaign was the grounding to a halt of that small mechanized portion of the 
German military machine. This effect was most pronounced upon the Luftwaffe, which 
simply could not operate without aviation grade gasoline. “No one can doubt that the oil 
offensive was extremely effective in reducing the combat power of the Wehrmacht and 
especially the Luftwaffe. Nor can it be doubted that it exerted no influence on the 
operations of German industry.”262 The greatest achievement of the USAAF during 
World War Two was completely separate from the vision which it had promoted. It is 
ironic that the main effect of the oil campaign was against the enemy air force; by 
strategic action the USAAF accomplished the same anti-air role it had originally been 
pigeonholed into which had resulted in its „rebellion‟ and turn to strategic doctrine. 
 Curiously, the USAAF found a champion in General Eisenhower if they were 
willing to modify their definition of success. Being an Army man Eisenhower had a 
different opinion of the effective use of air power, he believed it “did not destroy – it 
damaged.”263 He recognized a definite usefulness in the steady depletion and erosion of 
the enemy‟s abilities through bombardment. He saw airpower as a means to sow 
confusion and cause difficulty in supply and production for the enemy, but it was the job 
of the ground forces to successfully and completely deny them resources. This view was 
the antithesis of an independent air force controlled by airmen, something so desperately 
desired by the leadership of the USAAF. A consensus on the definition of success is as 
important as the actual operation itself. We see this played out in Korea, Vietnam, and 
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Iraq. A definition of victory must be agreed upon by both the political and military 
leadership and the public at the earliest opportunity. 
 In reference to the American bombing campaign against the German economy, 
Albert Speer wrote, “The idea was correct, the execution defective.”264 In this he was 
partially correct. Hopefully this study has demonstrated that, though based on solid 
theory, the doctrine developed prior to World War II was influenced by the projected 
reality in which it was developed; a bubble of intellectual reasoning, presumption, and 
assumption that turned out to be very different from the conditions faced in wartime. 
These preconceived notions resulted in fundamental misunderstandings by Allied war 
planners, and the expected results of bombing that many believed and preached caused a 
disconnect between decision makers and the reality on the ground. Due to bureaucratic 
rigidness and strict adherence to ideology, many of the lessons learned through combat 
operation over Ploesti were not promptly or effectively implemented. The results of such 
a divide between the perceived uses of new technology and its actual effects were waste, 
confusion, disappointment, prolonged suffering, and unnecessary deaths on both sides of 
the conflict. These aspects become clearly visible when one takes an overall view of the 
Ploesti campaign.  
 Driven by a desire to prove their beliefs correct, both to achieve victory and to 
insure an independent Air Force after the war, American air planners attempted to force 
their vision into being beyond the point required to admit reality. Due to a 
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misunderstanding of the fundamentals underlying their enemy they repeatedly attempted 
to achieve their goals while continuously compromising the doctrine they had so 
painfully developed, nurtured and protected. Ploesti is a prime example of the circular 
nature of bureaucratic systems. A bureaucracy will perpetuate the belief that established 
it, even past the point when it has been proven incorrect or invalid. As Freeman Dyson so 
eloquently stated, “The responsibility for criticizing and controlling military policies 
belongs to the political authorities of each country.”265 In a representative government, it 
is beholden upon the voting populace to expect and demand constant vigilance from their 
representatives. Those in positions of power, along with the citizenry, must demand that 
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ROMANIA IN FOG 
As you have seen, the German fog cannot prevent the destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti 
 BUT 
 ROMANIAN LIVES CAN STILL BE SAVED, IF YOU KNOW HOW TO IMPOSE AN END TO THIS KIND 
OF CAMOUFLAGE. 
Also the fog of the German lies, made up specially to keep Romania at war, cannot prevent the United 
Nations smashing any resistance on Romanian land. 
BUT 
 Hundreds of thousands of Romanian lives can still be saved, if you can impose the ending of the policy 
of sacrifice of Romania for Germany. 
THE FATE OF YOUR COUNTRY LIES IN YOUR HANDS. REMOVE THE GERMAN FOG. 
 
Dropped by the British Royal Air Force 
and the United States Army Air Force
266 
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Appendix 2  
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